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P R E F A C E 
Almost a l l of the developing countries have 
experienced conflicts at one time or the other since they 
became independent sovereign nat ion-states , some of them 
are s t i l l facing different kinds of conflicts, majority 
of them manifest themselves in the form of internal 
disturbances and disorder, which most often lead to the 
d is in tegra t ive and separatist movements. 
The po l i t i ca l system of these countries are 
suffering from the c r i s i s of governability either due 
': ^ the inab i l i ty of the system to meet out the ever 
increasing demands of different groups or the inabi l i ty 
of the ruling class to pay due respect to the demands 
of individuals , social, re l ig ious and ethnic groups which 
comprise the state* Minorities in most cases r ise up 
against the governments of the countries in which they 
are l iv ing largely due to t h e i r dissat isfact ion with 
t h e i r respective governments, leading to pol i t ica l 
struggle and internal i n s t a b i l i t y . The experience of 
India in t h i s respect i s not different from other 
developing countries. Rather i t has experienced a number of 
in te rna l turmoil and disturbances which are s t i l l con-
tinuing in some parts of the country. 
This study 'fAilitancy and Pol i t ical Development 
in Punjab' deals with the r i se of militancy and i t s 
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consequences for the pol i t ica l development in Punjab and 
vice-versa. I t analyses how militancy has hampered the 
functioning of democratic process and in s t i t u t ions and 
how po l i t i c s contributed to militancy and terrorism in 
Punjab. 
The study i s divided into four chapters. The 
f i r s t chapter endeavours to give a brief account of the 
problem. The second chapter analyses the genesis of the 
problem. I t t r i e s to ascertain the role played by h i s -
tory in giving r i se to militancy and terrorism during 
the entire decade of 1980's. Besides i t a lso t r i e s to 
comprehend the other factors which led to the problem of 
violence and governance in Punjab. 
The third chapter attempts to analyse the strategy 
of the Government of India to tackle the problem of 
militancy and terrorism to bring normalcy back in the 
s ta te . I t also suggests some ways which could have 
proved successful in dealing with terrorism there in 
Punjab. The fourth chapter of the study deals with the 
militancy and po l i t i c a l development in the s t a t e . I t 
t r i e s to shed l ight on the relationship of militancy and 
pol i t ica l development and vice-versa. The study then 
proceeds to draw conclusion in the las t chapter. 
This study i s based on the published sources. 
Although i t made use of different published souix:es 
l ike books, a r t i c l e s published in research journals 
and the news papers, i t claims no or ig ina l i ty e i ther in 
tapping of the sources or in the in terpre ta t ions of 
given facts . Despite the generous help of so many,, some 
discrepancies, however, could not be easily avoid^ed, 
I therefore, alone shoulder the responsibi l i ty for the 
deficiencies of argument and solecism in t h i s study. 
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CHAPTER - I 
I N T R O D U C T I O N 
The po l i t i c a l systems of the developing countries are 
facing a major c r i s i s of governability in view of ever 
increasing demand loads on the po l i t y . The term govern-
ab i l i ty refers to the integrative capacity of the po l i t i ca l 
system to produce desired resul ts and also to maintain 
the various contraaictions (socio-economic and p o l i t i c a l ) 
operating in the system/society. In other words i t refers 
to the enhanced capacity, especially of the administrative 
structure of the s ta te to implement i t s policies and 
programme. In contrast to th is def in i t ion , the pol i ty of 
most of the developing countries, over the years, have 
witnessed the gradual erosion of t h i s capacity to del iver 
the goods. The logic of decaocracy and the r is ing po l i t i ca l 
consciousness among the deprived section of population! 
further sharpening the pace of aemands on the pol i ty and 
as a resul t pol i ty i s increasingly loosing i t s efficiency 
to sustain overloads, leading to the process of d i s i n t e -
gration and in turn becoming vulnerable to a l l kinds of 
anti-democratic forces, which have/are producing c r i s i s 
of governability amongst almost a l l Afro-Asian countries. 
These po l i t i c s are undergoing a process of de-
ins t i t u t iona l i za t ion or dis- integrat ion instead of po l i t i ca l 
development, paving way for ' legitimacy c r i s i s ' of the 
po l i t i ca l system. 
The 'legitimacy c r i s i s ' which i s the resul t of the 
erosion of capacity of the po l i t i c a l system to del iver the 
'} 
goods (material resources, ecpjality of opportunity and 
social jus t ice) resu l t in multidimensional violence - both 
physical as well as cognitive, can be seen in such form as 
communal r i o t s , ethnic conflicts , group clashes, terrorism 
and other socio-economic as well as clandestine warfares. 
This study basically concentrates on the problen 
of terrorism in a par t icular state of India which i s 
unaergoing or has undergone the above mentioned experiences. 
The main objective of i ts study i s to understand and analyse 
the problem of terrorism in Punjab, i t s causes and conse-
quences, the governmental strategy to tackle the problem, 
with special reference to pol i t ica l development in the 
s ta te i . e . how militancy has hampered the functioning of 
democratic process and ins t i tu t ions and the impact of 
terrorism on the accepted democratic and secular norms of 
the nation as well as the role of pol i t ics in ign i t ing the 
ongoing feelings of alienation and escalating them to the 
extent of t e r r o r i s t and secessionist a c t i v i t i e s . Thus 
carrying a potential threat to the unity, i n t e g r i t y and 
security of the nation. 
To begin with, 'Terrorism' i s a brutal , undeclared, 
clandestine and l e tha l form of unconventional warfare. 
Terrorism l ike other forms of unconventional warfare i s 
the weapon ot m i l i t a r i l y weak, short of confronting the 
2 
enemy conventionally in q^en combatraent. In fact , i t i s 
3 
consistent with the essence of c lass ical military strategy, 
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the efficacious use of force to achieve a desired policy. 
Terrorian, in other sense, can also be defined as a psycho-
logical warfare because i t publicizes the t e r r o r i s t ' s 
p o l i t i c a l cause, demonstrates t h e i r capabil i t ies , d i s -
heartens enemy, discourages a l l i e s . I t i s a threat of 
violence or an act or series of acts of violence effected 
through surreptious means by an individual, an organisation 
or a group of people to further his or their pol i t ica l 
goals . The target of the i r attack are generally the 
innocent people and those in authority,Their s trategies 
are based on alertness, mobility and attack. Though no 
mass support i s necessary ei ther for i t s emergence or i t s 
continuation but thei r t ac t i c s a l ienate masses from the 
legi t imate system. The strategy of terrorism i s such that 
i t achieves i t s goal not through i t s acts of violence but 
through the response to i t s ac t s . In any other warfare 
violence i s the beginning and i t s consequences are the 
end of i t . For terrorism, however, the consequences of 
the violence themselves are merely a step tov,/ards the 
achievement of i t s objectives. The acts of violence in 
Punjab l ike indiscriminate k i l l ing of innocent people, 
bomb b las t s at public places in s ta te transportations, 
kidnapping of prominent personal i t ies etc, were directed 
t o exercise pressure on the governmental machinary to 
succumb to the genuine/ingehuine demands of t e r r o r i s t s . 
The objec t ives of t h i s form of warfare are manifold l i k e 
revolution^ changing uf the e n t i r e systemj dismemberment J 
autonomy^ change of a pa r t i cu l a r government or change in 
a p a r t i c u l a r pol icy of a government. 
Terrorism has been a ser ious problem for the secu-
r i t y of n a t i o n s . I t creates such a mess t h a t a nat ion 
finds very hard t o l e t i t s e l f out . I t has c rea ted a dilemma 
as hew t o defend nat ive i n s t i t u t i o n s and var ious i n t e r e s t s 
against the t h r e a t s of te r ror i sm while preserving t h e i r 
e s sen t i a l c h a r a c t e r , popular support and w i l l i ng 
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compliance. I t has become a c l e a r and dangerous th rea t 
to the normal and democratic l i f e of the na t i ons . I t has 
made the democratic p o l i t i c s almost imposs ib le . The 
e lec t ion boycott of Sri Lanka, and El Salvadoor are the 
examples where i t has destroyed the ground for any com-
5 
promise, or t o take the example of the s t a t e under study, 
Punjab where mil i tancy brought down the democratic process 
to a hau l t . I t a l so created a c l imate of b i t t e r n e s s and 
hatred, poisoned the r e l a t i ons between d i f f e r en t e t hn i c / 
r e l i g i o u s / c a s t e groups. 
Terrorism has almost g lobal ised i t s e l f . The dramatic 
value of t e r r o r i s m during the past decade and i t s concomi-
tant p o l i t i c a l and psychological impacts have produced a 
c r i s i s of near global propor t ions . Espec ia l ly , developing 
countr ies with p o l i t i c a l l y unstable systems, economically 
deprived and poverty striken masses, provide fer t i le 
ground for the eruption of t h i s kind of unconventioial 
warfare. Terrorism has proved to be one of the major cause 
of i n s t ab i l i t y in many developing countries. India i s one 
of them with plural, hetrogenic social fabric, widespread 
economic dispar i t ies regional as well as intra-regional , 
desire for greater power share, perceived threat to the 
iden t i ty , culture and rel igion by the ndnorities provide 
favourable breeding ground for such kind of violent 
group/ethnic/communal clashes. Post-independent India 
faced insurgency, terrorism, militancy, naxalism in areas 
l ike North East, in ter ior south, border areas of Punjab 
and Kashmir. In North East and some other parts of our 
country the situation i s not yet peaceful. 
In fact, the developing countries, including India 
are desperately struggling to maintain and defend the i r 
national and t e r r i t o r i a l in tegr i ty against clandestine 
warfares l ike terrorism. 
In case of India, the democratic process has nega-
t ive ly operated to weaken i t s capacity of c r i s i s management, 
The insensi t iv i ty and unrepresentative character of 
dysfunctional democratic i n s t i t u t i ons has further distorted 
the ar t icula t ion of pressure po l i t i c s of the bargain 
counters. The diminishing charisma of regional and national 
leaders has changed the basic character of public protests 
and agitations in India. Deteriorating fa i th and confidence 
of people in democratic, peaceful and legal methods of 
bringing changes in our society i s paving way for r ising 
'Cult of violence' which, if not checked properly, will 
ultimately destroy the tenuous civic order that exists 
today. 
The sovereign identity of India l ike many of the 
newly independent Afro-Asian nations fore-warrants a 
concept of t e r r i t o r i a l integri ty and i t s sacredness. 
Whether i t i s India or any other developing country, heart 
of the problem i s to preserve the national borders, i n t e -
grity both from internal and external dimensions of 
th rea ts . Nation building exercise in India i s essential ly 
an attempt to strengthen national integrat ion, the pol i t ica l 
aspect of which has been accomplished but the socio-
cultural and economic components of which continue to 
generate, unfinished struggles within the po l i t y . The 
enormity of t h i s challenge gives misgivings about the 
continuation of po l i t i ca l integration of the Indian nation 
s ta te . In fact, the 'Cultural sub-nationalism' of the 
sub-continent, even after par t i t ion, continues to threaten 
'Pol i t ica l Nationalism' and i t s v iabi l i ty to survive as 
a nat ion-state . The pol i t i ca l nation-state of India has to 
struggle with cul tura l sub-nation groups of i t s plural 
society and buy time so that economic nationalism may 
sprout and cul tural sub-nationalism of the sub-continent 
may give way to create larger politico-economic en t i t i e s 
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of viable nature. 
One of the major source of generating a n t i -
democratic forces in the form of terrorism threatening 
the s t a b i l i t y , integri ty and security of our country i s 
'Majority revivalism' and 'minority fundamentalism'. 
The problem of Indian minorities has three levels 
of awareness ( i ) the grievance s i tua t ion , ( i i ) the 
identi ty c r i s i s , ( i i i ) homeland dream through secession. 
However, i t i s the last one which succumbing to militant 
means becomes a threat not only to governability but to 
the very existence of a nation. The terrorism in Punjab 
with i t s massive killings and destruction entai l ing huge 
cost for the country in terras of human, organisational 
and financial resources has to be linked to such pers-
pective. 
Though generically, the Khalistan oriented t e r ro r i s t 
movement in Punjab i s not much different from other 
socio-pol i t ical group conflicts and other t e r r o r i s t 
movements that India has faced so far in i t s moderni-
sation and po l i t i ca l development. That i s the difference 
g 
on account of i t s theocratic content. Complicated by 
the r e a l i t i e s of the Indian history, both pre and post-
independence, the nature of economic development in that 
s t a te , the nature of evolution of po l i t i cs and po l i t i ca l 
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development in i t , the advancement of the Sikh inigrants 
abroad, Pakis tans ' x e t a l i a t i v e posture with re fe rence 
t o i t s contigui ty t o the s t a t e and the remotely and 
l a t e n t l y encouraging environment of cer ta in c i r c l e s of 
high in te rna t iona l p o l i t i c s . 
One of the major fac tor responsible for the Sikh 
mil i tancy i s our de f in i t i on of secularism which be l i eves 
not in separation of p o l i t i c s and rel igion but a s s igns 
an act ive role t o r e l i g i o n in p o l i t i c a l f i e l d . Consequently, 
r e l i g i o n has been used and misused for p o l i t i c a l g a i n s . 
Secularism in India went on developing a c l e a r s l a n t of 
what may be viewed as appeasement of communalism (pa ro -
c h i a l l o y a l i t i e s of the various rel igious mino r i t i e s t o 
t h e i r re l ig ions r a the r than t o the p o l i t y ) . 
The h i s t o r i c a l background of the Akali movement 
i n Punjab in the course of I n d i a ' s na t iona l i s t moveraent 
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was appreciated and encouraged by the mainstream. This 
i s the f i r s t h i s t o r i c a l base of legitimacy of what i s 
being flaunted today as t he i ssue of Sikh i d e n t i t y . The 
second legitimacy of the na t ional movement success fu l ly 
dissuated Sikhs from making any serious move for 
Sikhis tan or Khal is tan . The t h i r d basis of leg i t imacy 
has been the grievance of Sikh community tha t a Punjabi 
suba was not created a f t e r the reorganization of s t a t e s 
on the l i ngu i s t i c bas i s for long and, in the meantime, 
the leaders who agitated to demand for such a statehood 
were humiliated. The fourth basis has been that of 
inter-group confl ic t - the non Sikh punjabis getting Hindi 
recorded as t h e i r mother tongue in the census thereby 
19 hurtening the sentiment of the co-l inguist Sikhs, The 
issues of Chandigarh, share in r iver water for i r r igat ion 
and indus t r i a l non-investment in agr icul tural ly productive 
13 and affluent Punjab e t c . , have also added to the rising 
legitimacy of the Sikh cause based on militancy promoted 
by h i s to r ica l and religious t radi t ions of martial sp i r i t , 
heroic struggles against tyranny and rel igious catering 
for martyrdom. The frustration of the Akalis following 
14 the return of the Congress(I) to power , the shabbiness 
of internal r i v a l r i e s of the congress(l) intermeshing i t s 
15 leadership, a t points, with the fundamentalists and the 
external environment, gave a great f i l l i p to the legacy 
of the Sikh demand for greater autonomy formulated in more 
and more c r y s t a l l zed fashion with the advancement of the 
1970s and the advent of 1980s. Such was the soi l on which 
the t e r r o r i s t movement for Khalistan grew. 
As in the case of a l l t e r ro r i s t movements, a key 
element in the strategy of Khalistan terrorism was to 
create t e r r o r , to undermine the authority of the adminis-
t rat ion and to demonstrate their own strength. The strategy 
of Khalistani t e r r o r i s t s ' , however, contained other key 
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elements also specific to them. One i s to appear as defender 
of Sikhs and Sikh re l ig ion, to widen the gulf between Hindus 
and Sikhs, to create a s i tuat ion in which large scale 
Hindu-Sikh r io ts break out, to force Hindus of Punjab to 
migrate to other s ta tes and to create a s i tua t ion in which 
Sikhs from other s ta tes are also forced to migrate and 
encouraged to do so. 
They star ted by ki l l ing Nirankaris including 
Nirankari Sikhs because orthodox Sikhs have strong pre-
judice against them. Then i t was the turn of Hindus in 
general and such individual personalit ies whose k i l l ings 
v;ould provoke Hindus in and outside Punjab in to senseless 
violent acts against innocent Sikhs. 
Though the s ta te i s back to normalcy but the s ta te 
of affairs as existed t i l l l a te 1980s put a question mark 
on the claims of India as a successful democracy, i t s 
secular poli ty, efficiency of administrative, in te l l igence 
and governing bodies as well as the loyalty to the demo-
cra t i c values/norms, to the respective s tate system and 
patriotism of the minority communities ( re l ig ious /e thn ic ; . 
The various issues related with Punjab terrorism have been 
studied (causes, governmental strategy) in juxtaposit ion 
with the issue of po l i t i ca l development or decay, during 
the period of militancy there . The point i s to analyse 
the manner in which 'Religion' i s used as a tool for 
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p o l i t i c a l expediency and how the grievances of minor i t i e s 
a re given communal overtones by the p o l i t i c a l e l i t e s t o 
grab and susta in t h e i r cont ro l over power. Kow r e l i g i o u s 
fundamentalism leads to ' l eg i t imacy ' and ' s t r u c t u r a l 
c r i s i s ' r e su l t ing in the erosion of effectiveness of 
admin is t ra t ive machinery in handling the demand load on 
the p o l i t y . Thus, loss of f a i t h in the present s ta te -sys tem 
as well as loss of people 's cooperat ion t o the s t a t e adminis-
t r a t i o n , making i t more vulnerable t o d is in tegra t ing and 
ant i-democrat ic forces . Though the terror ism in Punjab 
seems t o have died down but the fac t i s tha t i t i s con-
t inu ing in one way or the other put t ing a question mark 
on the governabi l i ty and adminis t ra t iveness of Indian 
s t a t e system. 
* * * # * 
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CHAPTER - II 
GENESIS OF THE PROBLEM 
The word ' S ikhs ' derived from the P r a k r i t - Sikkha 
which in Sanskr i t became Sishya meaning d i s c i p l e . I t grew 
as a new sect around 'Hinduism' but outs ide i t . The 
re l ig ion was evolved by a succession of t en gurus . The 
c r ed i t , i n f a c t , goes t o Guru Nanak for the c r e a t i o n of 
t h i s s e c t / r e l i g i o n . However, the con t r ibu t ion of s ix th 
Guru i s worth mentioning here as he was the one who combined 
temporal and s p i r i t u a l a u t h o r i t i e s by p u t t i n g two swords -
one on the r i g h t and the other on the l e f t - combining Meeri 
and Peeri ( t e n ^ o r a l , and s p i r i t u a l a u t h o r i t i e s ) . From t h i s 
time onwards Sikhs continued to combine r e l i g i o n and 
p o l i t i c s . Likewise the seeds of separate i d e n t i t y were 
sown by Guru Qobind Singh. He inspi red h i s folk men with 
fa i th and gave them five Ks as a d i s t i n c t mark - Kes (long 
h a i r ) , Kangha (comb) kripan (sword) kachcha ( shor t dramers) 
and kara ( s t e e l b r a c e l e t s ) and thus c rea ted Khalsa on 
April 13 , 1699 a t Anandpur Sahib. He bap t i sed the five 
devotees and got himself baptised from them by giving 
power t o the ' sangat t o over-rule the Guru and thus c rea ted 
r ea l democracy. This i s how one can t r a c e the course of 
p o l i t i c i s a t i o n of r e l i g i o n or the fusion of r e l i g i o n and 
p o l i t i c s in Sikhism as well as the development of mi l i t an t 
a t t i t u d e amongst Sikhs. 
MISL or t e r r i t o r i a l confideracles which were 
created during 1745-1767, a period which saw about 9 Afghan 
invasions, determine t o the large extent t he Sikh socio-
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p o l i t i c a l expectations even today. MISL were c r ea t ed t o 
defend the Sikh t e r r i t o r y from any kind of i n v a s i o n s . In 
times of s t r i f e loca l l e a d e r s organised the bands of ab le 
bodied Sikhs, i n i t i a l l y t o f ight against Afghans or Mughals 
and ul t imate ly t o f ight with each other. However, the idea 
of MISL became firmly embodied in the minds of Sikhs as 
accepted, recognisable way of organising for c o n f l i c t s . The 
present day fact ional ism i n Punjab p o l i t i c s i s the modern 
ecpjivalent to these anc ient confiderancies, A knowledge 
of 18th century MISL s e t s p a t t e r n for and l e g i t i m i s e s the 
modern factionalism in p o l i t i c s , UVe are behaving, people 
may say t o themselves' as our fore-bears did when one MISL 
2 
s truggled against another i n former glorious t i m e s ' . 
While the above mentioned facts r e f l e c t the develop-
ment of v io lent methods and struggles for safeguarding t h e i r 
l i f e l i b e r t y and property as well as fusion of r e l i g i o n 
and p o l i t i c s , there were other factors respons ib le for the 
development of ' t h r e a t t o the re l ig ious i d e n t i t i e s ' , 
l a rge ly associated with the i s sue of the cont ro l and 
management of Gurudwaras, 
Gurudwaras acquired grea t significance a f t e r Guru 
Gobind Singh's procalamation of Granth Sahib as the e t e r n a l 
Guru and became the pivot of Sikh social l i f e a s t h i s was 
the place where sacred book was housed. A4any gurudwaras 
were run by Hindu ttahantas (supervisors) or those who had 
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abandoned t h e i r outward symbols of f ive Ks and became 
ind i s t i ngu i shab l e from Hindus. The p roper t i e s of the guru-
dwaras came t o be recorded In t h e i r names. 
Percept ion of a grave t h r e a t t o t h e i r r e l ig ious 
i d e n t i t i e s because of the above mentioned reason paved way 
for the s e t t i n g up of shiromani Gurudwara Prabandh.ak 
Committee (SGPC) to manage the Golden Temple in 1920. Few 
months l a t e r 'Akali Dal' or the army of the fa i thful or 
immortal was created to wrest con t ro l of gurudwaras from 
3 
the Mahants. 
Simultaneously the compaign run by some Hindu couimunal 
forces t o deny the emergence of Sikhism as an independent 
r e l i g i o n led t o a growing fear amongst the Sikh e l i t e s t h a t 
the s ikhs might be absorbed in the Hindu soc ia l system. 
This i s how, h i s t o r i c a l l y speaking, sikhs s t a r t ed 
perceiving themselves as a separate people . The Sikhs have 
been t r y i n g t o obtain recogni t ion of t h i s d i s t i n c t i d e n t i t y 
for decades. The underlying object ive of the s t ruggle thus 
was p o l i t i c a l power. 
There were various other fac tors which provided fuel 
to the otherwise dormant demand for independent recogni t ion 
Sikh i d e n t i t y i n the post-independence era which by the 
decade of l a t e 1970s took the form of ' K h a l i s t a n ' . The 
causes behind can be analysed under following ca t ego r i e s . 
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1) IMPERIAL CONSPIRACY 
Br i t i sh i m p e r i a l i s t who ruled India t i l l 1947 did 
a l l they could t o keep Indian people divided and to weaken 
t h e i r unity in the f ight for independence. As a par t of t h i s 
policy of ' d i v i d e and r u l e ' i the Br i t i sh r u l e r and t h e i r 
spokesmen made p e r s i s t e n t e f for t s t o plant communal fee l ings 
i n the minds of t he people . 
The ongoing r i v a l r y between Hindu l eade r s orMahantas 
and Sikhs, whereby growth of Sikhism as an independent 
r e l i g ion was denied, was ful ly u t i l i s e d by B r i t i s h t o 
incu lca te , encourage and strengthen the f a l s e and r eac -
t ionary concept of an independent p o l i t i c a l i d e n t i t y of 
the Sikhs. 
Against t h i s background added with the demand of 
Pakistan by Muslim league, Akalis too demanded 'Azad Punjab' 
i n 1942 when Cripps Mission arr ived in I n d i a . The Sikhs 
were encouraged by the Br i t i sh t o regard themselves as a 
t o t a l l y d i s t i n c t and separate nat ion. They made p e r s i s t e n t 
ef for ts t o i ncu l ca t e among the people the dangerous idea 
of r e l ig ion as the ba s i s of n a t i o n - s t a t e s . 
MILITANCY AND RELIGION 
The percept ion of Sikhs with regard t o t h e i r p o l i t i c a l 
world and motivation i s deep rooted in t h e i r c u l t u r a l and 
r e l i g ious t r a d i t i o n s in which mil i tant p o l i t i c s has been 
regarded as an inseparab le par t of p o l i t i c s ever since 
IS 
the days of Guru Govind Singh. Another r e l a t ed factor i s 
the in93ortance of the 'Khalsa I d e n t i t y ' . According t o 
Sudhi Kakkar the 'Two elements niilitancy and martyrdom 
are i t s inner counterpar ts of the well known f ive Ks which 
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c o n s t i t u t e the outer marks of the Khalsa I d e n t i t y ' , Since 
the days of the great Guru GOvind Singh, one dying for 
the cause of the panth i s g l o r i f i e d and t r ea t ed as a martyr. 
On t h i s ground t e r r o r i s t i n Punjab j u s t i f i e d t h e i r inhuman 
ac t s of violence and genocide. This i s how they t r i e d t o 
acquire mass recognit ion t o the element of 'Independent 
Punjab ' . 
Militancy and r e l i g i o n , as a m t t e r of fact have 
always been a par t of Akali p o l i t i c s in Punjab during the 
post-independence period. Sikhs always resor ted t o mi l i t an t 
posture in order t o achieve t h e i r goals whatever they may 
be , what i s new i s not mil i tancy ra ther i t s increased 
dimension, i n t e n s i t y , changed objec t ives . I t a l s o c a r r i e s 
the explanation of extremist and t e r r o r i s t facing l i t t l e 
d i f f i c u l t y in adopting mi l i tancy and the r a t i ona l e behind 
t h e i r appeal t o the psyche of the Sikh masses i n highly 
subject ive terms in the name of re l ig ious p res t i ege and 
5 honour of the panth. 
The re l a t ionsh ip between re l ig ion and mil i tancy or 
r e l i g i o n and p o l i t i c s thus paved for a s ign i f i can t ro l e 
t o be played by 'Akal Thakht ' . The Thakht i s regarded as 
the seat of both s p i r i t u a l and secular powers. Besides, 
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Akal Takht i s also the seat of theocratic education in 
Punjab where the children of sna i l , rura l peasants get the 
education completely based on Sikh scr iptures and r i t ua l s , 
devoid of modern education and scient i f ic outlook. Granthis, 
ragis and p r i e s t s appointed at various gurudwaras, are 
also the product of this i n s t i t u t i on , who are important 
players in the poli t ico-rel igious affa i rs of Punjab, 
This t radi t ion continued in post-independence period 
with const i tu t ional backing for such provisions. Article 
30 of our consti tution safeguard the r ight of minorities 
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to establ ish and administer their educational ins t i tu t ion . 
These tradit ions made the task of Sikh t e r ro r i s t s 
much easier since they had a very legit imate channel (Akal-
Takht) t o get the i r ideas accepted and recognised at the 
grass root level J they were able to influence the common 
man once re l igious e l i te was under the i r cont ro l . Religious 
confirraity to militancy in Punjab helped i t both in i t s 
i n i t i a t i on and sustainance. 
RELIGIOUS FUNDAMENTALISM 
Fundamentalism was what made the s i t u a t i o n explosive 
in Punjab. This fundan^ntalist re l igious revivalism i s a 
universal phenomenon. All great world re l ig ions are going 
through a rev iva l i s t phase. Islam, Hinduism, Christ ianity 
and even the Sinhalese Buddhist have fe l t I t s s t i r r ings . 
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In Punjab the r i s e of sant Bhindaranwale was a phenomenon 
tha t has a lo t i n common with the Iranian model. Modernity 
brings in i t s wake a c e r t a i n amount of wes te rn iza t ion , 
capi ta l ism, and a consumer based society not concerned 
with have nots , A fr inge society of jean-c lad and smack 
taking youth emerges, who have no rapport with the old 
order. The I ran ian revo lu t ion was what r e l i g i o u s fundamen-
t a l i s t f e l t was the 'Maghrib Zhadgi' or over v/es ternizat ion 
of the Shah of I r a n . The Bhindaranwale movement a l s o , was 
based upon a r e t u r n t o the old pur i tan ica l v a l u e s . The 
second common fea tu re , was the use of r e l i g i o u s places and 
organisations as a base for p o l i t i c a l and ext remis t a c t i v i t y . 
I t took tremendous p o l i t i c a l wi l l to enter t he se r e l i g i o u s 
p laces . We had no choice for the consequences could have 
been disas t rous and i r r e p a i r a b l e . Religious b igo ta ry and 
in- to lerance are ge t t i ng a fresh lease of l i f e i n many 
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places threatening the secular fabric of our soc ie ty and 
governabi l i ty , 
SOCIO-ECONOMIC FACTORS 
P a r t i t i o n deprived many of the Sikhs of t h e i r land 
and homes. Hard work and i n i t i a t i v e res tored t h e i r p ros-
pe r i t y . Green Revolution s t ra tegy has been highly successful 
i n Punjab, Rich peasantary led t o the growth of regional 
leadership as well as demand for indus t r i a l development 
which was conpletely neglected in Punjab, After a g r i c u l t u r a l 
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production reached i t s optimum, demand for big indus t r i e s 
and for ' ag ro - indus t r i e s ' grew a t l a rge . Akali leaders 
s t a r t e d saying t h a t , *when we produce agr icu l tu ra l goods 
why should we have not the r i g h t s t o s e l l them at the 
highest ava i l ab le price in the in t e rna t iona l market V Why 
should we be forced to s e l l our produce to the Government 
of India a t the price fixed by i t for de f i c i t Indian 
s t a t e s ? ' Clear ly th i s i s a demand for prof i te r ing p r i ce s 
as d i s t i n c t from the very j u s t i f i e d demand of the peasantory 
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for remunerative p r ices . 
S imi lar ly the landlords and the kulaks have been 
demanding grea te r share in the s t a t e power who were a l ready 
a dominant force in the economy of the s t a t e and wanted t o 
be as dominant in the power s t ruc tu re of the s t a t e . They 
want t o r u l e the s ta te and want Punjab under t he i r hegemony. 
But t h i s des i re for greater power-share was not centred t o 
reg ional l eve l ra ther took na t iona l overtones, some 
developed a l l India i n t e r e s t including i n d u s t r i a l i n t e r e s t . 
Thus power demand manifested i t s e l f i n various shades from 
lO 
reg ional autonomy to secession or independent statehood. 
Along with economic prosper i ty there has been a 
marked inc rease in the l eve l s of l i t e r a c y in Punjab as 
elsewhere i n the country in the l a s t few decades. This has 
led t o a c l a s s of semi-educated r u r a l youth who are not 
prepared t o take up the t r a d i t i o n a l pursui ts of a g r i c u l t u r e . 
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Yet white c o l l a r or blue c o l l a r jc*»s are not avai lable i n 
such numbers so as t o absorb them a l l . There i s thus a 
la rge rese rvo i r of d i sconten ted , educated unen?)loyed youth. 
This i s a dangerous and v o l a t i l e mass which i s angry, 
turbulent and can be e a s i l y manipulated. This i s the f ishing 
ground for n a x a l i t e s , r e l i g i o u s fundamentalists and t e r r o -
r i s t s . The bulk of the t e r r o r i s t s in Punjab ( p a r t i c u l a r l y 
the youth wings) have come from th i s category. This mass 
of educated but unemployed youth i s not j u s t confined t o 
Punjab. 
Socio-economic f ac to r s led to the naxa l i te movement 
in VJest Bengal, Tilangana, Andhra Pradesh and in some 
other pa r t s of Ind ia . North East i s s t i l l under violence 
due t o the prevai l ing socio-economic factors t h e r e . They 
contr ibuted a l so t o the v io l en t s i tua t ion i n Punjab. 
Despite tremendous success of Green Revolution i n Punjab 
such kind of socio-economic tensions are a paradox tha t 
need a separate and independent analys is . 
CLASS CHARACTER OF THE PROBLEM 
The case of Punjab i s not l ike bihar where we are 
witnessing an upsurge of the land less against the r i c h 
farmers. Had i t been so we would have seen a l ine-up of 
the poorer Mazabhi and Ramdassi Sikhs against the r i che r 
J a t and Khatri c l a s s e s . The bulk of the t e r r o r i s t s r e c r u i t s 
have come from the more prosperous Ja t and Khatri Sikh 
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c l a s s e s . Over the years the Akali party has come t o 
represent J a t and Khatri Sikh i n t e r e s t . Success of Green 
Revolution was l a rge ly the r e s u l t of t h e i r hard work. And 
yet the Green Revolution i s petering out because of two 
factors : 
(a) FRAGMEI^ ATION OF LAND HOLDINGS : 
Punjab ' s 70>< of ag r i cu l t u r a l land i s owned by a 
small number of people while the r e s t of t he land by 
majority of poor farmers and share c roppers . The average 
size of the land holding of the poor farmers i s 5 acres 
farm. With the pressure of increasing populat ion and socia l 
moves these a re get t ing further broken up. Below 5 acres 
farm i s not economically v i ab le . Hence, out of the two t o 
three sons t h a t a farmer may have the farm can support j u s t 
one, with j u s t one son on farm, the o thers must find employ-
ment elsewhere. That employment i s not forthcoming. Hence 
the d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n tha t f i na l ly leads t o despai r and 
extremism. 
( b ; RURAL INDEBTEDNESS : 
The Green Revolution in Punjab has been financed 
by bank l o a n s . Bank loans enabled the farmers t o buy 
t r a c t o r s , t h r e s h e r s , f e r t i l i s e r s , p e s t i c i d e s , seeds and 
other inputs r equ i red . Rural peasantry was thus under a 
heavy debt burden. Repayment of debt and the i n t e r e s t became 
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a problem as the price of produce f a i l s t o keep pace with 
the p r i ce of i npu t s . An acre under the r ice/wheat cycle 
y ie lds a t bes t Rs. 7000 per annum. To tha t extent dis turbed 
condi t ions suited the r ich peasantry not only in Punjab but 
elsewhere m the country as we l l . They forced the government 
t o ensure constant supply of a g r i c u l t u r a l inputs as well 
as to luaintain a mnimum support p r i c e . I f pushed far 
enough they could force the Government t o even cancel 
t h e i r l o a n s . The rural r ich were under a heavy burden. The 
farmer with small holdings were equally affected, in f ac t , 
more so . Their co l lec t ive anxiety i s a t the root of a l o t 
of Punjab 's unres t . What i s required was/is a quick so lu t ion 
on the pa r t of government t o force the pace of land-reforms 
or t o re-shape i t , so that share of land can be given t o 
14 the l a n d l e s s . 
Economic grievances were given commercial overtones. 
A big majority of the Punjab peasants and landlords i s 
Sikhs. P o l i t i c a l l y , a small sec t ion of i t has been with 
the congress , majority with the Akali Dal and even the 
Akali Dal leadership in the hands of r u r a l r i c h , the 
Kulakas and the landlords. A big majority of the peasantary 
i s a l so Sikh by re l ig ion and J a t s by c a s t e . V^hile most of 
the a g r i c u l t u r a l labourers belong t o the scheduled c a s t e . 
Thus, c a s t e and re l ig ion , economic c r i s i s , proved t o be 
in^or tan t t o o l s in the hands of Akalis who were able t o 
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r a l l y behind them, the middle and the poor peasants and 
other Sikhs as w e l l . Even non-religious demands were 
presented as the demands of the Sikhs. They t r i e d t o j u s t i f y 
the i r a g i t a t i o n for more power and freedom on the ground 
tha t : 
1) Centre d i scr imina tes against Punjab because Punjab's 
majority i s t h a t of the Sikhs, and the i r demands are not 
accepted because Sikhs are t rea ted as second c l a s s 
c i t i z e n s . On the economic front ant i -people economic 
pol ic ies of the government leading to growing d i s p a r i t i e s , 
unenployment, a t r o c i t i e s on weaker sec t ion , corrupt ion and 
too much of bureaucra t i sa t ion led to grave discontentment 
especia l ly amongst r u r a l youthj 
2) For Sikhs, r e l i g i o n and p o l i t i c s are i n s e p a r a b l e . 
Therefore economic c r i s i s and other g r ievances , 
despite spectacular success of 'Greea.Rev/olution' , were 
given r e l i g i o u s co lour s . Not only government but a l so the 
Hindu res iden t of Punjab were held responsible for t h e i r 
misery. Gradually they came over the conclusion tha t a 
greater share i n power-structure of the na t ion can be 
helpful i n resolv ing t h e i r problems. This fee l ing was 
infact ign i ted and given fuel by the p o l i t i c a l e l i t e s of 
Punjab who had vested i n t e r e s t . Thus, worsening economic 
s t a t e of majority was u t i l i s e d by top p o l i t i c a l s t r a t a for 
p o l i t i c a l expediency by giving i t r e l ig ious and p o l i t i c a l 
colours . Soon they s t a r t ed propogating the t h e s i s - 'Sikhs -
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a separa te nat ion ' and ' t h e s ikh must have separate p o l i -
t i c a l i d e n t i t y ' (not only r e l i g i o u s i d e n t i t y ) and demand 
•Kha l i s t an ' . The origin of t h i s theory i s rooted i n the 
h i s to ry of Punjab since B r i t i s h e r s conquered Punjab from 
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a Sikh r u l e r and the Sikh must r u l e Punjab again . 
POLITICAL FACTORS 
An analys is of p o l i t i c a l factors shovws t h a t what 
has happened in Punjab i s a f a i l u r e of our at tempts t o 
s ecu la r i s e p o l i t i c s in the count ry . We have fa i l ed t o break 
the nexus between r e l i g i o n , c a s t e and p o l i t i c s . The legacy 
of the Br i t i sh s t ra tegy of ' d i v i d e and r u l e ' a f f ec t s our 
p o l i t i c s even today. Though the seeds of r e l i g i o u s 
separat ism as a basis for p o l i t i c a l demands were sown by 
the B r i t i s h , who did t h e i r bes t t o preserve the Sikhs as 
an exotic in Indian mi l ieu . Most of the p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s 
use r e l i g i o n , cas te and such parochial values for the 
purpose o{ p o l i t i c a l expediency in the post-independence 
e r a . The most depressing f ea tu r e has been the co l lus ion 
between some unscrupulous p o l i t i c i s m (e .g . Akalis i n 
Punjab) and the criminal elements of society, the smugglers, 
r acke tee r s and i l l i c i t b rewers . Flow of i l l e g a l money and 
muscle power in Indian p o l i t i c s , and the c r i m i n i l i s a t i o n 
of p o l i t i c s i s the d i s t i ngu i sh ing feature of our p o l i t i c a l 
fabric today. In Punjab the bulk such people joined the 
s e p a r a t i s t movement t o furnish t h e i r cause of smuggling 
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and t r a f f i k i n g . The charismatic hold of sant Bhindaranwale 
over the Sikh masses was well exploi ted and made him some 
so r t of a patron backed by number of Sikhs in foreign 
c o u n t r i e s espec ia l ly United S t a t e of America (USA), Canada, 
and United Kingdom (UK). The Congress party of India used 
t h i s movement t o frighten t he Hindus t o vote for them. 
After the creat ion of t h e Punjabi Suba the Akali 
par ty came t o power t h r i c e i n t he s t a t e but had always 
t o be supported by the Congress and once the BJP. None of 
these governments were permit ted t o l a s t i t s normal t e n u r e . 
This was a l so t o be the f a t e of the only e lec t ion won by 
Akalis with the required majori ty i n 1985 where i t was 
able t o form i t s own government without the support of any 
other p a r t y . But the subsequent events led to the f a l l of 
Burlana Ministry with which s t r e s s on the Akalis increased 
i n t e r n a l l y and party was s p l i t i n t o various fac t ions . 
Meanwhile, Bhindaranwale, who proved to be a 
Congress frankestein l a t e r on assumed leadership of the 
ex t r emis t . He was encouraged by the Congress for two 
reasons : 
1 . I t would f in i sh the moderate leadership of the Akal i s , 
2 . I t would enttarrass Darbara Singh, the p o l i t i c a l r i v a l 
of z a i l Singh.^^ 
The s t ra tegy of Congress par ty to ru le the Punjab 
was based on the following t a c t i c s : 
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1» I t enjoyed a f a i r l y good percentage of Hindu votes , 
p r a c t i c a l l y a l l scheduled cas te votes including a 
ndnority of Sikh votes . Hence, t h e i r p o l i c i e s were t i l i e d 
in favour of above mentioned category* 
2. To impress the Sikh voters tha t i t always gave Chief 
Minis tership to a SikhJ 
3 . I t supported Sikh fundamentalism t ry ing t o prove tha t 
Congress Sikhs were more t rue t o t h e i r f a i t h than the 
Akali S ikhs . No Akali Chief Minister i n the Punjab 
pondered so much t o Sikh fundamentalism as the Congress 
Chief Minis ter z a i l Singh, In 198U e l e c t i o n s Bhind^anwale 
conqDaigned for the Congress and even government funds 
and resources were used to promote himj 
4. Posts of honours were always given t o the Sikhs to 
appease them but a t t en t ion t o t h e i r genuine socio-economic 
requirements was more or l e s s completely lack ing . 
5. A small microscopic minority even r a i s e d the demand for 
Khal is tan . 
The year of 1977 was a watershed year in the p o l i t i c s 
of Punjab giving r i s e to extremism when Bhinda;canwale was 
given a p o l i t i c a l push by the Congress. He i n h e r i t e d the 
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organisat ion of 'Damdarai Taksal ' which was increas ingly 
mil i tant in na tu re . Bhindaranwale and Khal i s tan group were 
separate i d e n t i t i e s and i t was much l a t e r t h a t the two 
converged i n t o one. Because of his r e l i g i o u s differences 
2'J 
with Nirankaris the re developed a r i f t between Bhinda.ran-
wale and the Akal is which was f i l l e d by Congress . 
Trained in a fundamentalist t rad i t ion , , head of a 
theocrat ic i n s t i t u t i o n - Akal Takht - which i s a l so the 
pivot of Punjab p o l i t i c s , Bhindaranwale got an audience 
among the r u r a l Sikhs and s t a r t ed pursuing fundamentalist 
po l i c i e s . A s i zeab le number of youths were r e c r u i t e d who 
had no other o u t l e t s for creat ing u t i l i z a t i o n of t h e i r 
abundant energy. The vote p o l i t i c s of Punjab led t o 
competing communalism by the Akalis and the Congress, In 
March 1981 Shrimari Gurudwara prabandhak Committee (SGPC } 
declared Sikh as a separate nation and complained of 
18 discrimination aga ins t Sikh, By 1982 Sant Bhindaranwald 
openly s t a r t e d using such choicest Akali a g i t a t i o n a l words 
as were used by other Akali leaders such as ' t y r a n n y ' , 
' s l a v e r y ' , 'holy war' e t c . to influence the Sikh psyche. 
These words had already became the idioms of Punjab p o l i t i c s . 
ROLE CF AKALI DAL 
The f i r s t p o l i t i c a l party exclusively represen t ing 
the Sikh community was formed (Akali Dal) i n e a r l y twenties 
which provided a platform for the asse r t ion of a separate 
Sikh i d e n t i t y , but a t the same time created a minority 
complex among the Sikh community, Sikh fear of losing t h i s 
iden t i ty in a pre-domlnantly Hindu India became sharpened 
when p o l i t i c a l power continued t o erode the Akali party 
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even in Punjab. This tu rned the Akali energies i n t o 
organising p o l i t i c a l a g i t a t i o n s at regular i n t e r v a l on 
various issues - p o l i t i c a l , economic, a g r a r i a n , l i n g u i s t i c 
and re l ig ious in order t o broaden the i r areas of in f luence . 
All such ag i t a t ion had only one single objec t ive t o promote 
the legitimacy of the 3ikh des i re to rule in Punjab and 
were rooted in a supposed denial of the perceived claims 
t o p o l i t i c a l supremacy i n the s t a t e . 
Before independence the Akali party functioned as 
an adjunct of the Indian National Congress. After indepen-
dence and p a r t i t i o n in 1947, there were rumblings of 
due to 
discontent in the Akali party/wooing of Akalis by the 
Congress par ty , the major segment of which stayed away from 
the Congress. The gulf between Congress and the Akali par ty 
continued to grow t i l l i t became nearly unbridgeable in 
the 1970s. Mrs, Indi ra Gandhi used two well thought out 
s t r a t eg ies to f in i sh off the Akalis as a v iab le Sikh 
p o l i t i c a l party which could challenge designs of the 
congress party to ru l e the Punjab. 
1. She encouraged the growth and expansion of t he Sikh 
extremist movement by giving covert support t o 
Bhinddranwale and; 
2 . When he became uncont ro l lab le , took to l a rge scale 
k i l l i ngs and plunder and established a r e ign of t e r r o r 
in the Punjab, she ordered Army to flush out the 
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the t e r r o r i s t s from the ho l i es t shrine of the Sikh, 
the Golden Tenple. 
She l a r g e l y succeeded in her des igns . The Mcali 
party which represen ta ted the moderate segment of Sikhs 
became i r r e l e v a n t in Punjab. Inevi tably the extremists 
gained ground as the Akali party became non-functional for 
quite some t ime. The army act ion in t h i s background made 
Sikh community i n India and abroad d iscontented , su l len , 
angry and a l i e n a t e d . 
Extremism, thus , had an open f i e l d t o spread out 
i t s roots agg res s ive ly . Harvinder Ahuja observes tha t 'The 
Akalis and the extremist were a t the root cause of the 
ent i re c r i s i s , tha Akalis for dai ly r a i s i n g , r e i t e r a t i n g 
and renewing t h e i r demands without r e a l i s i n g t h e i r s ign i -
ficance and repercuss ions . Everyone knows, they never 
raised any demand when they were rul ing i n Punjab but once 
out of power, they suddenly became vo ta r i e s of the Sikh 
cause. One of t h e biggest crimes i s t o have blurred the 
d i s t inc t ion between the Sikh re l ig ion and p o l i t i c s . The 
Akali Dal i s and always was a p o l i t i c a l pa r ty and whatever 
the Akalis were asking for was a l l p o l i t i c a l i n nature 
and based on a de s i r e for power in Punjab. They shamelessly 
gave a r e l i g i o u s facade to i t and mouthed t h e i r demands 
from ins ide the holy p laces . They exploi ted the peasantary 
and the i l l i t e r a t e Sikh masses by ra i s ing the bogey of 
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the panth in danger. Whenever they issued a c a l l for 
a g i t a t i o n , i t was always addressed to the Sikhs and not 
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t o t h e i r own party men'. The ro le of Akali i^al in Punjab 
p o l i t i c s t o turn to violence was to great t h a t i t needs a 
separate ana ly s i s . 
DECAY OF MORALITY 
The growth of extremism in youth in India since 
1947 i s co-terminous with the decay of morals in Ind ia . An 
unjust system ree .ing with corrupt ion i s enough to produce 
t e r r o r i s t s against t he i r own government. In the presence of 
unpr incipled and rapacious p o l i t i c i a n s and bureaucrates 
who enjoyed both power and influence* the disgust of 
i d e a l i s t i c youth was n a t u r a l . Increasing ro l e of money 
and muscle power caused much f ru s t r a t i on amongst the youths, 
The l ink between rampant cor rupt ion and youth ex:remism i s 
c l e a r . Extremism in Punjabvvas l inked to a extent to the 
a t t i t u d i n a l changes, moral decaying in the youths who 
were t a rge t ed by the leaders of Khalistani movement for 
the lecrui tment for t e r ro r i sm . 
ROLE OF EX-SERVICENEN 
This i s the single most important and v i t a l f ac to r . 
I t i s one of the most s i g n i f i c a n t factor as each year 
approximately 60,000 servicemen are released from se rv i ce . 
A f a i r proport ion of these go t o the Punjab. Due to the 
imperat ives of keeping a young prof i l e in the service* 
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servicemen are r e t i r e d r e l a t i v e l y ea r ly . Since the mi l i t a ry 
i s a closed micro society there are considerable read jus t -
ment problems faced by ex-servicemen, the b igges t of which 
are the economic imperatives of s e t t l i ng down in a new 
c iv i l environment. Ic can often lead to anxie ty bordering 
on depression or neurosis and consequent adjustment 
problems. If the mass of the educated unenployed youth 
present a very l u c r a t i v e fishing ground for fomenting 
t rouble, the d e s t a b i l i s a t i o n poten t ia l of t h i s t ra ined 
mili tary manpower i s even more dangerous and how dangerous 
i t has beenwas highl ighted in Punjab. Two r e t i r e d Major 
Generals of the Indian Array, Jaswant Singh Bhullar and 
Shabeg Singh, masterminded most of the t e r r o r i s t s ' 
Operations in the" Bhindaranwale phase. Valuable mi l i ta ry 
e . pe r t i s e , e spec ia l ly experience in insurgency type opera-
t ions was ava i l ab l e to them par t i cu la r ly i n the person of 
Maj. Gen. Shabeg Singh- who had gained vast experience in 
low-intensi ty operatiot.s in Wagaland and i n the 1971 
India-Pakistan War. I t was t h i s that l en t such a dangerous 
aspects to the unrest i n Punjab. Serious attemjDts were 
made through r e l i g i o u s fundamentalist and communal overtones 
to subvert the l o y a l t i e s of serving and r e t i r e d Sikh 
so ld ie rs . The number of arms indigenously acquired by the 
t e r r o r i s t s were staggering and could not have been acquired 
without the ex-serviceman connection. Operation Metal 
became a f u l l - s c a l e conventional assaul t which caused 
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cons iderable casua l t i e s to our fo rces . No amount of 
smugglers and criminals could have generated such effect ive 
firepower and r e s i s t ance . In te r roga t ion r epo r t s of Pakis tani 
t ra ined t e r r o r i s t s indicate t h a t Pak i s tan i in te l l igence 
personnel were primarily looking for Sikh ex-servicemen. 
They have i n t e l l i gence value and a re being preferred for 
t r a in ing and formation of hardcore t e r r o r i s t c e l l s . The 
phenomenon i s not confined to Punjab a lone . The recent 
r i s e of Subhash Ghising's Gorkha National Liberation 
Front i s a grim warning of the dangerous po ten t i a l of 
unemployed and disgruntled ex-servicemen who are rec ru i t ed 
for a n t i - n a t i o n a l / s e c e s s i o n i s t causes . There i s an impera-
t i ve need therefore to look a f t e r our ex-servicemen and 
continue t h e i r 'education' in the realms of national 
i n t e g r a t i o n , pa t r io t i sm, democratic and secular values 
and r e spec t for other r e l i g i o n s . Much i s being done for 
r e h a b i l i t a t i o n of ex-servicemen, but far more needs to be 
done t o assuage the b i t t e rness of being unwanted and 
forgo t ten . This breeds a l i ena t ion and a l i e n a t i o n among 
t ra ined m i l i t a r y manpower can be exploi ted by the d i s -
i n t e g r a t i v e fo rces . The Government and the Army need t o 
reach out t o our ex-servicemen, t o i den t i fy t h e i r problems, 
and take meaningful steps to resolve them. 
1980-84. PERIOD OF SIKH ALIENATION 
This was the period wnen many i n c i d e n t s took place 
which a l i e n a t e d Sikh masses and were made t o perceive in 
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those inc iden t s a r ea l t h r e a t t o the i r i den t i t y -
humil ia t ion of Sikh s o l d i e r s during Asiads in Haryana, 
opposi t ion of Hindu organ isa t ions on the ban of smoking 
i n and around Golden Temple complex, the breaking of 
Golden Temple Replica a t Chandigarh railway s t a t i o n , 
burning the p ic ture of Guru Ramdas, In t h i s background 
Bhindaranwale said, 'S ikhs were second c lass c i t i z e n s and 
s laves i n India and tha t they must f ight for t h e i r 
independence. Our aim i s t o break the shackles of t h i s 
s l a v e r y ' , 
Thus 3 hi nda ran wale's f igh t against the cen t ra l 
Government was not too far removed from Sikh struggle 
which since the 10th Guru has been mostly vievi/ed in the 
images of ' l i f t i n g up the sword' against .he tyrannica l 
r u l e s . The sense of grievances and a l ienat ion increased 
manifold a f t e r the Operation Blue Star in 1984 which 
con^ le t e ly shook the sikh psyche. To quote Khushwant Singh, 
'now i t w i l l be increas ingly d i f f i c u l t t o find a self-
r e spec t ing Sikh who wi l l have a kind word to say for the 
government. Sikhs wi l l f ee l i s o l a t e d and a separate 
p e o p l e ' • This army ac t ion was exploited by the leaders 
of independence to the maximum advantage for t h e i r cause, 
a l i e n a t i n g the Sikhs from the mainstream, jus t i fy ing 
t h e i r demand for Khal i s tan . 
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UNJUST RE-ORGANISATION 
The re-organisat ion of Panjab in November 1966 
was not appreciated by the Sikhs . Chandigarh was made a 
union t e r r i t o r y . Many Punjabi speaking v i l l age s / a r ea s 
were given t o Haryana while many Hindi speaking v i l l a g e s 
came t o Punjab largely because Tehsi l not v i l l age was 
made the bas i s of division and secondly la rge number of 
Hindus had got recorded Hindi as t h e i r mother tongue. 
While Akali Dal leader Master Tara Singh came out 
with a demand for a Sikh-Suba which was l a t e r on modified 
t o a Punjabi speaking province in which Sikh should be 
a t l e a s t 60^ of the population and Punjabi language - t he 
mother tongue of a l l Punjabis (.Sikhs + Hindus). Hindu 
conmunalists on the other hand, made the fa l se asse r t ion 
t h a t Hindi and not Punjabi was t h e i r mother tongue. They 
too gave r e l i g ious colour to the e n t i r e i s s u e . Many (Hindu) 
Congress leaders refused t o consider Punjabi as t h e i r 
o f f i c i a l language, even with the option t o use the Devnagri 
s c r i p t . Against the demand for a Sikh majority 'Punjabi 
Suba' , a demand for 'Alaha-Punjab' i n which Sikhs would 
be micros"opic minority was advanced. 
Thus, in t h i s manner, the i s sues of language 
and of formation of Punjabi speaking s t a t e were highly 
p o l i t i c i s e d to assume heavy communal over tones . Punjabis 
got communally divided. Consequently re -organisa t ion of 
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s t a t e on l i n g u i s t i c basis was much delayed though i t 
was an old promise of the Congress. Not only v a^s i t 
delayed but led to widespread differences between the two 
conmunities - Hindu Punjabis and the Sikh Punjabis. 
There i s no doubt tha t Punjab had c e r t a i n genuine 
grievances e . g . 1) Chandigarh, {2) d i s t r i b u t i o n of r i ve r 
water, (3) Proper demarcation of Punjabi speaking areas 
and (4) a few re l ig ious demands. The Congress government 
was w i l l i ng t o give a favourable verdic t on most of these 
problems but they wanted t o make i t a quidpro-quo for 
an e l e c t o r a l dea l . Vv'hile the Akalis combined r e l i g ion with 
p o l i t i c s , the government of India was equally gui l ty of 
ge t t ing advantages for the congress par ty out of the 
performance of i t s duties as the Government. The negot ia t ion 
between the two dragged on and the Akalis used t h i s to 
impress upon t h e i r follov;ers t ha t they could get no j u s t i c e 
from the Hindu dominated Government, 
The vote p o l i t i c s of Punjab, t h u s , led to competing 
communalism by the Akalis and the Congress, The Congress 
was unable t o deal with the problem firmly and objec-
t ive ly as i t always hoped to s t r i k e an e l e c t o r a l deal 
with them,^^ 
Punjab underwent a decade of extremism and violence 
due to various p o l i t i c o - r e l i g i o u s and other re la ted f a c t o r s . 
In fac t , i t has no single or common cause. I t s causes were 
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CHAPTER - I I I 
GOVERNMENT STRATEGY 
Dealing with t e r ro r i sm i s not an easy t ask because 
terror ism i s not the r e s u l t of j u s t one f a c t o r . I t i s 
r a the r the product of a combination of f a c t o r s . As such 
a multipronged s t ra tegy t o aeal with the problem a t 
psychological , s o c i a l , p o l i t i c a l , economic and secu r i t y 
leve l i s requi red . Experiences of Punjab,North East and 
other places l i k e Northern I re land , Sri Lanka, Lebanon, 
Algeria e t c . are i nd i ca t i ve of the fact t h a t regarding 
ter ror ism only as a secur i ty problem i s not going to 
solve i t . Dealing with i t from purely mi l i t a ry poin t of 
view i s no answer t o i t . This approach a l i e n a t e s the 
people because repress ive powers may also be r i g h t l y 
or wrongly, used against innocent people thereby forcing 
the a l ienated people to jo in hands with t e r r o r i s t s . I t 
a l so c rea tes sympathy for them. Besides this^ the repress ive 
are 
measures undertaken by the government/condemned by human 
r i 'hts a c t i v i s t s and other organisat ions. Unfortunately 
for most of time our government r e l i ed more on mi l i t a ry 
solut ion t o Punjab problem. 
CPERATION BLUE STAR"'" 
When the problem in Punjab s tar ted ho t t ing up in 
the early 198Cs, unanimous view was that army involvement 
would not be in the i n t e r e s t of the organisat ion or the 
t e r r i t o r y md tha t should i t be involved i t would lead 
t o trouble in some u n i t s . 
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Takht. I t a lso had very wrost effects on the Sikh 
psyche. The loss of the Sikh l i b r a ry with i t s r a r e and 
i r r ep l aceab le documents was pa r t i cu la r ly a damaging blow 
t o Sikh h i s t o r y / h e r i t a g e . All t h i s lef t the Sikhs fu l l 
of anger and resentment. The immediate reac t ion of 
Operation Blue Star was one of the dismay and anguish. 
The Sikhs not only in Punjab but everywhere were outraged 
and shocked. The most ser ious react ion was in the Army. 
Sikh so ld ie rs in I r rge number deserted the Army u n i t s 
and headed towards Amritsar . A serious c r i s i s of d i s c i -
p l i n e was created, apart from doubting the s u i t a b i l i t y 
of Sikh for mi l i ta ry and other sensi t ive s e rv i ce s . 
I t was a gross case of misuse of r e l i g i o u s p lace ' 
for destroying the secular charac ter of our p o l i t y whic* 
has granted enjoyment of freedom of re l ig ion to i t s 
every c i t i z e n . This a lso puts a question mark on the 
functioning of our democracy as a successful means for 
the preservat ion of the secularism in India as enshrined 
5 i n our c o n s t i t u t i o n . 
Those who condemn the army action or compare i t 
with Jalianwala Bagh massacre paid no due cons idera t ion 
mainly to two things -
1 . Golden Temple and other gurudwaras were being used t o 
offer immunity to c r imina l s , t e r r o r i s t s and those who 
worked to disrupt the uni ty and in teg r i ty of the 
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country as well as of the piousness and sanc t iv i ty 
of the r e l i g i o n they claimed t o be fol lowers . In 
I n d i a s ' recent history i t was t h i s which necess i ta ted 
the government to take ac t ion agains t those t e r r o r i s t s 
hiding in the Golden Temple. Sanct i ty of the Golden 
Temple was not violated by the government but by those 
who were breaking the pr ide and digni ty of the nation 
ard t h e i r r e l ig ion as we l l . 
2. Jal ianwala Bagh masscre involved the genocide of 
armless , innocent and p a t r i o t i c people a t tending a 
peaceful assembly. 
A r e a l i z a t i o n l a t e r on grew tha t r e l i g i o u s l i b e r t y 
and to l e rance on the part of government and the massess 
in no way means the use of r e l i g i o u s places by the people 
of any f a i t h , to defy the a u t h o r i t i e s by turning them 
i n t o armed f o r t r e s s e s . In f ac t , secularism wi l l not 
survive i n any country i f a f a i t h takes i t on i t s e l f to 
destroy the e s sen t i a l unity and i n t e g r i t y of the country 
unJer any p r e t e x t . Mis in te rpre ta t ion of secularism and 
conver-fing holy shrines i n to armed fo r t r e s se s by a 
community l i k e Sikh, who have d i spropor t iona te ly more 
men in armed forces , than they can l eg i t imate ly said to 
be e n t i t l e d t o , may prove f a t a l t o the secur i ty of 
na t ion . The ac t ion which the government has had to 
take in Punjab was neither aga ins t the Sikhs nor the 
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Sikh r e l i g i o n , i t was against te r ror ism and t e r r o r i s t s . 
Besides the re was no a l t e r n a t i v e l e f t with the government 
other than army a c t i o n . The government i n f a c t in the 
beginning adopted a persuasive and c o u n c i l i a t a r y approach 
to the problem. I t s f a i lu re led t o the army a c t i o n . 
Whatever i t s consequences i t was a harrendous event in 
the his tory of independent Ind ia . 
OPERATION BLACK THUNDER 
Operation Blue Star could not put an a n t i d o t e t o 
violence and genocide by the t e r r o r i s t s . The aggravating 
s i tua t ion was once again made i t necessary on the par t 
of the government of India t o undertake another armed 
act ion aga ins t the t e r r o r i s t s . 
The e l e c t i o n of G.S. Tohra to the p re s iden t sh ip 
of SGPC i n 1986 in jec ted new l i f e in to the s eces s ion i s t 
movement in Punjab. Security forces were disbanded from 
regula t ing the e n t r i e s of the Golden Temple complexs 
So that i t could not be reused for a n t i - n a t i o n a l a c t i -
v i t i e s . Tohra ' s e l ec t ion t o SGPC was supported by 
t e r r o r i s t s . 3o he was under obl igat ion to r e h a b i l i t a t e 
few of them i n t o SGPC as i t s employees. This l ed t o the 
occupation of complex of Golden Temple by t e r r o r i s t s . 
They s t a r t e d k i l l i n g people ins ide the complex of the 
Temple. Tor ture and ex tor t ion s t a r t ed in a big way. 
Terrorism continued t o grow, r a the r f la red up unabated 
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in the l a s t of 1980's which witnessed the l a rge sca le 
k i l l i n g s of innocent people both Sikhs and Hindus. 
However t h i s period was a l so marked s ign i f i can t due t o 
thiee developments. 
F i r s t l y , the determination of the cen t r e and the 
s t a t e to deal firmly with t e r r o r i s t s who were using the 
premises of the Golden Temple complex to fu r the r t h e i r 
secess ionis t a c t i v i t i e s as a consequence of which Operation 
Black Thunder was launched. Secondly, the i n t r o d u c t i o n by 
the cen t ra l government of l e g i s l a t i o n , in the form of 
ordinances such as the •Religious I n s t i t u t i o n s (prevent ion 
of Klisuse) Ordinance and 'The Arms (Amendment) Ordinance 
1988, which provide for c a p i t a l punishment for causing 
death by use of i l l e g a l firearms and ammunition and 
enhances the maximum sentence for possession, u se , sa le 
and manufacture of prohib i ted arms and ammunition t o l i f e 
imprisonment. And Thi rd ly , the s t a t e governments' plan 
t o c l ea r a 300 mt, swathe around the Golden Temple complex 
of a l l buildings and cons t ruc t ion , ostensibly t o beaut i fy 
t h e Temple surroundings but more so to ensure t h a t i n 
future the surrounding would not provide a hidden ent ry 
and exi t i n to the complex, nor t o be used by a n t i -
na t iona l elements for armed s t ruggle against t he s t a t e . 
As mentioned e a r l i e r the complex s i t u a t i o n i n 
Punjab dr i f ted from bad t o worse with no immediate 
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prospects ot solution in s i g h t . continuarKe of p r e s i d e n t ' s 
r u l e f a i l ed t o improve the law and order s i t u a t i o n in 
Punjab. The growth of violence was consis tent ly on the 
a scen t . Almost a pre-operat ion Blue Star s i t u a t i o n emerged. 
To meet out the s i t u a t i o n Operation Black Thunder 
was launched in two ser ies - I i n the wake of the dec-
l a r a t i o n of Khalistan by the f ive member panthic Committee 
from the precinct of the Golden Temple on Apri l 29, 1986, 
and Second in May 1988. Task assigned to NSG (National 
Securi ty Guard) was t o flush out the undesirable elements 
from the premises of the Golden Temple complex. In add i t i on 
t o increas ing pressure over t he m i l i t a n t s , the t a c t i c s 
adopted by the NSG was t o search and destroy strong 
pos i t i ons of the m i l i t a n t s . They pinned down the m i l i t a n t s 
t o t h e i r rooms. At each stage precaution was taken t o 
ensure t h a t the sanct i ty of the holy shrine was not 
de f i l ed and tha t loss of l i f e was kept to minimum. 
Se lec t ive use of force was made. In a l l i t was very 
planned and s t r a t e g i c a l l y executed operation. 
The escala t ion in t e r r o r i s t violence which became 
alarming in 1988 reg is te red a d e f i n i t e reversa l a f t e r 
Operation Black Thunder I I . I t exposed the hollowness 
of the m i l i t a n t s regarding t h e i r commitment to t h e i r 
professed goa l , t he i r scant regard for the Sikh r e l i g i o n 
and t r a d i t i o n s ! and exploded the myth that they l-iad c rea ted 
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about themselves as being f e a r l e s s , s e l f - s a c r i f i c i n g 
crusaders of Sikh panth. Though the top m i l i t a n t s d i s -
owned a l l those who surrendered during Operation Black 
Thunder I I , i t was no denying that the humil ia t ing manner 
of surrender brought d i sc red i t to the m i l i t a n t s i n the 
eyes of the Sikh masses. A large number of t e r r o r i s t s 
l i s t e d out by the Punjab pol ice were trapped i n the Golden 
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Temple complex a t the time of Operation Black Thunder I I . 
Though Operation Black Thunder too could not put 
an ant idote e i t h e r on the exis t ing t e r r o r i s t organizat ions 
or development of new ones. Fresh r e c r u i t s were e n l i s t e d 
by the mi l i t an t groups p a r t i c u l a r l y by Khal i s tan commando 
Force (KFC ) . But the most s ign i f i can t thing was t he loss 
of cen t ra l i sed command of con t ro l . Most of t h e mi l i t an t 
groups were plagued with mutual suspicion^ accusa t ions and 
r i v a l r i e s . Di lu t ion of the ideological content in the 
extremist a c t i v i t i e s a lso r e su l t ed in t h e i r degenerating 
i n t o criminal and mercenary a c t i v i t i e s . Not only wi thin 
the country but a l s o outside po la r i sa t ion was c l e a r l y 
v i s i b l e in the m i l i t a n t o rganisa t ions . Thus the year 
1989 witnessed a progressive diminit ion in v i o l e n t and 
mi l i t an t a c t i v i t i e s of almost a l l the m i l i t a n t oi 'ganisat ions. 
But the t rend of subdued extremist v i o l e r c e in 
the post 'Black Thunder-I I ' period proved t o be a temporary 
phenomena. Last quar te r of 1989 witnessed a s teep increase 
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i n v io lence . Since October 1989 the declining graph of 
violence took a sharp upward curve and the s i t u a t i o n was 
becoming more or l e s s s imi la r t o tha t existed in p r e -
operat ion Black Thunder e r a . T e r r o r i s t s a c t i v i t i e s were 
not only more aggressive but a l so more sophis t i ca ted in 
t h e i r techniques and f a c t o r s . The kind of weapons they 
used were a lso highly soph i s t i c a t ed . There was a renewed 
supply of arms/ammunition/material and moral support from 
ou t s ide . Random and ind i sc r imina te ki l l ing of s ecu r i t y 
fo rces , o f f i c i a l s , p o l i t i c i a n s and Hindus a t l a rge 
c rea ted t e r r o r and fear amongst Hindus l iving in Punjab. 
In t h i s renewed phase of violence and t e r r o r , m i l i t a n t s 
aimed a t es tab l i sh ing p a r a l l e l authori ty and admiLnistration 
(through levying taxes and revenues) . 
Despite such massive armed action l i k e Operation 
Blue Star , Operation ',.ood Rose ( in the rura l a reas t o 
i den t i fy and round up suspected extremist , t e r r o r i s t s and 
t h e i r sympathisers) and Operation alack Thunder I and I I 
government fa i led t o put an an t ido te on mili tancy i n the 
s t a t e . This i s a r e f l e c t i o n of the fact that i n handling 
t e r r o r i s t movements repress ion as a single point s t r a t egy 
had never succeeded success fu l ly . Terror is t a c t i v i t i e s 
i n the face of specific armed ac t ion underwent dormancy 
but resurfaced with great vigour afterwards. 
Government always d e a l t the problem on an adhoc 
b a s i s by employing and deploying more and more pa ra -
51 
mi l i t a ry forces/armed forces, A number of r e l a t e d fac to rs 
l i k e t r a i n i n g , equipment and weaponary of these forces 
was not given due considerat ion. Only t h e i r s t rength was 
reviewed every t ime. Besides, government was pr imar i ly 
concerned with the curbing and combatment of v io lence , 
an outcome of various problems and f ac to r s , problems 
respons ib le for terror ism were not properly attended 
and t a c k l e d . Though the p o l i t i c a l process which was 
i n i t i a t e d by the Government of India culminated i n t o 
Rajive-Langwal Agreement, 1986, col lapsed due to the 
in tens ive opposi t ion by the t e r r o r i s t o u t f i t s and majority 
of the p o l i t i c a l leadership . This even led to the a s s a s s i -
nation of Sant Longwal. Later on the Government of India 
i t s e l f could not decidedly worked for the implementation 
of the Agreement due to the opposi t ion faced by i t from 
Haryana, The assass ina t ion of Sant Longwal was a major 
event which rendered the p o l i t i c a l leadership ine f fec t ive , 
thereby paving the way for the t e r r o r i s t s to v i r t u a l l y 
have fu l l con t ro l over the a f f a i r s of Punjab who were not 
ready to accept anything l e s s than Rha l i s tan . 
Experiences show tha t at d i f fe ren t t imes, r a the r 
in d i f f e ren t s i t u a t i o n s , d i f fe ren t measures were applied 
for dealing with the problem of t e r ro r i sm, some t imes , 
in some c a s e s , purely mil i tary measures were appl ied . 
They achieved some success in some cases but in most 
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they fai led. There are some practical problems involved 
with purely mil i tary measures to combat terrorism, Robert 
A Fried Lander says that the state violence when directed 
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against the individual endangers the l ike response. I t 
inevitably curbe the c iv i l l ibe r t i es which in turn 
generates or accentuate discontentment against the 
government, a highly desired objective of the t e r r o r i s t s 
who use the repressive measures of the government to pro-
pogandise that i t i s ruthless, cruel and does not care 
for us. Z.K, zawodny points out that the more t e r ro r the 
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governments apply more fighters they produce. This helps 
the sustenance of terrorism. This also remains one of the 
strategic ctojectives of the t e r ro r i s t s tha t i f terrorism 
keeps going i t may destabi l ise the econcxny and discredi t 
the government. Moreover, pure military measures tend to 
create a feeling that the situation i s get t ing out of hand. 
A multipronged strategy i s necessary for meeting 
out the th rea ts of terrorism. I t should be fought 
different fronts mi l i ta ry , po l i t ica l , economic, social 
and psychological. If i t has to be rooted out successfully 
a well coordinated efforts on a l l fronts should be under-
taken by the government. And this re la t ionship of 
coordination be maintained at every stage. This aspect 
was not given due and considerate consideration in case 
of Punjab by the government of India. 
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The f i r s t step towards th i s i s to understand that 
no instant solution and miracles are possible. What i s 
required i s a proper perspective of the problem^proper 
organisation and u t i l i za t ion of the resources of the s ta te 
to resolve the problem of terror ism. I t also requires 
determination^patience^deep understanding of the issues 
and the people involved. 
Understanding of the problem is as essent ia l as 
the dealing with terrorism. I t i s very essential t o 
analyse the po l i t i c a l , socia l , economic, psychological, 
ideological and geographical factors which are involved 
in motivating the people to take up the arms. In other 
words the government must t r y to eliminate those 
grievances upon which the propogators of terrorism 
c a p i t a l i s e . Social and economic dispari t ies often offer 
ready motivations to the population to par t ic ipate in 
antinat ional a c t i v i t i e s . 
Such problems which provide the cause of terrorism 
should be resolved. I t i s said that whatever the degree 
of dissat isfact ion which forces the people to take up 
the arms against the government regime with the intent ion 
tha t through this means they can achieve what they are 
not getting otherwise, no leader of terrorism can offer 
to the people, the bet ter politico-socio-econom:Lc 
conditions as the government can. The government should 
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aim at severing the connections and linkages of the 
t e r r o r i s t s from the general public by ins t i tu t ing such 
p o l i t i c a l , social and economic reforms which would 
establ ish governmental prestige and authority. This may 
resu l t in al ienating the population from the t e r r o r i s t 
movement in developing public resistance against them. 
This might succeed in building up confidence in population 
about the government. The ant i -na t ional /d is in tegra t ive / 
separat is t movements which India has faced since i t s 
independence to the large extent have been contained 
and tackled due to the effective action taken by the 
government to ei ther rehabi l i ta te or divide, disorganise 
and broken the insurgents / ter ror is ts groups through 
mil i tary , paramilitary and po l i t i c a l offensives. 
Terrorism aims at a target audience that i s much 
wider than the available at the s i t e of the t e r r o r i s t 
violence. I t aims at seeking maximum media coverage 
for the i r acts of violence to t e r ro r i s e others and their 
cause for which they conmitting violence. This i s where 
the government must aim to s t r i ke , to minimise the conse-
quences of the violence. Unnecessary and exagerated media 
coverage helps the t e r ro r i s t s in the i r fight against 
the regin«. Media coverage for increasing the dis t r ibut ion 
of newspapers i s an unprincipled ac t iv i ty against the 
in t e re s t s of the nation. This should be given due 
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consideration by the persons involved in media and by 
the government as wel l , A decade of terrorism in Punjab 
shows that role of media in dealing with i t was not given 
proper consideration either by the government or the 
media i t s e l f . 
PrcA)lem with terrorism i s also that i t s thea t re 
of operation i s very large. I t has globalised i t s e l f in 
i t s operations and support to i t from external sources. 
I t i s needed to be tackled internatiorially. But unfor-
tunately the response of internat ional community to t h i s 
problem has been more feeble and problematic. v<hat to 
say about finding a solution to the problem, the community 
has quibbled over such questions as who i s and i s not 
a t e r r o r i s t . Most s tates have remained unwilling to apply 
s t r i c t legal actions against t e r r o r i s t s . Not only t h i s , 
many of the nations have a syrqpathetic at t i tude towards 
the po l i t i ca l aspirations and objectives of groups who 
apply terrorism. This a l l has created obstacles for 
tackling terrorism. However the efforts have always been 
made to deal with i t , 
A general agreement for international cooperation 
i s l ike a sinqua non for the effective prevention of 
10 
internat ional terrorism. International legal response 
towards terrorism has largely been treaty based both 
b i l a t e r a l and mult i la tera l . Some international conventions 
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l i ke the convention of Offences and ce i ' t a in other Acts 
committed on Boards Aircraf t , Tokyo, September 14, 1963, 
the Conven for the Suppression of Unlawful se izure of 
Ai rc ra f t , Hague, Decemoer 16, 1970, the convention for 
the Suppression of U nlawful Acts aga ins t the Safety of 
c i v i l Avia t ion , Montreal, Septe^rJaer 23, 1971, the c onven-
t i on on the Prevent ion and Punishment of c i imes . Against 
In te rna t iona l protec ted persons including Diplomatic 
Agents, New York, December 1973, and I n t e r n a t i o n a l 
Convention aga ins t the Taking of Hostages, New York, 
December 17, 1979 have no doubt promoted i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
cooperation which t o some extent has con t r ibu ted towards 
the combatment of terror ism i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y . 
A general p o l i t i c a l w i l l t o uphold the ru l e of 
law to p ro tec t innocent and defeat the t e r ro r i sm i s 
very v i t a l for the successful implementation of the 
t r e a t i e s and conventions without which a l l t r e a t i e s and 
conventions w i l l not be worth the paper they a re wr i t t en 
on. I n t e r n a t i o n a l agreements aga ins t the specif ic t e r r o r i s t 
ac t ions are far more p rac t i ca l than attempt to outlaw 
te r ror i sm as such. Punjab t e r ro r i sm v^ich was i n s t i g a t e d 
from outside mainly by Pakistan and other NRI Sikhs 
general ly based in England, uni ted S ta tes of America 
and Canada was not tackled e f f e c t i v e l y of i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
l eve l e i t h e r due t o the unwil l ingness , enmity between 
India-Pakis tan and non-effective cooperat ion given by 
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England and USA to the government of India, concerted 
efforts of international level are also very essent ia l 
for combating terrorism. 
The another most important and effective means 
of prevention and tackling terrorism is the in te l l igence , 
which can provide a real time and actionable information. 
The intelligence - network should try to gain in for -
mation prior to the onset of violence. If the in te l l igence 
i s weak, the security forces can not act thus can only 
react as happened in Punjab with regard to the use of 
Golden Tenple for violence by t e r ro r i s t s . Our in te l l igence 
network was not so effective in dealing with Punjab 
problem. Intelligence i s a means to attack on the 
breading ground of terrorism. I t s effective u t i l i z a t i o n 
i s essentially necessary. 
The Government of India dealt with the problem 
with 
of terrorism in Punjah/ i t s lack of determination and 
c lear poli t ical vision in the beginning of the terror ism 
allowed i t to continue in one form or the other. We 
can say the po l i t i ca l ambitions of the then rul ing 
party in Delhi were of prime consideration for i t than 
the national i n t e r e s t s . Though the terrorism to the 
most extent has been contoated and tackled but i t s t i l l 
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CHAPTER - IV 
MILITAfCY AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IN PVHJAB 
The term governability in general refers to the 
integrative capacity of the po l i t i ca l system to produce 
the desired re su l t and to maintain the various contra-
diction (socio-economic po l i t i ca l ) operating in the 
society. In other words, i t refers to the ehhanced 
capacity, especial ly of the administrative s tructure of 
the state to in^jlement i t s pol icies and programme. In 
contrast to t h i s definition the pol i ty of developing 
countries over the years has witnessed the gradual erosion 
of i t s capacity to deliver the goods. Consequently, instead 
of po l i t i ca l development these countries have undergone 
•de- ins t i tu t iona l i za t ion ' / ' d i s - in tegra t ion ' of s t a t e 
structure. India i s no exception and i s facing ' s t ruc tura l 
c r i s i s ' and i t s related consequences of physical and cog-
nit ive violence in the form of communal r i o t s , ethnic 
conf l ic ts , group clashSjterrorism, insurgency and other 
socio-economic conf l ic t s . 
The dynamics of terrorism in Punjab can not be 
completely understood until perceived within thi'.s framework 
of po l i t i ca l development/decay or ' s t ruc tu ra l c r i s i s ' . 
There exis ts a cause and effect relat ionship between the 
two. The overall po l i t i ca l context had an impact on 
terrorism which in turn had rendered the democratic 
process in the s t a te ineffective and meaningless during 
the period of terrorism there. 
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THE BACKGRCXJhP 
FOX much of the period of violence and t e r r o r i s m , 
Punjab has not had a s t a b l e , e lec ted government. The 
e l ec t ed governments were e i t h e r d is in tegra ted or replaced 
by president rule , part ly as a resul t of in ternal f ac -
tionalism and partly because of pressure arising from 
militancy, terrorism and pressure from New Delhi. Even 
when presidential rule has not officially been in^osed in 
Punjab, there has been a tendency since 1980 to ru le i t 
d i r ec t ly from New Delhi as a ' t rouble state*• Punjab 
confl ic t i s best seen as a po l i t i ca l conflict that has 
been transformed i t s e l f into a fratr icidal or ethnic 
warfare. However three somewhat different in te rpre ta t ions 
are also given to Punjab problem : 
Fi rs t , there has been a tendency in some of the 
l i t e r a t u r e to hold Indira Gandhi personally responsible 
for Punjab's po l i t i ca l turmoil. There have been several 
variat ions on that theme : (1) Indira Gandhi was an 
indecisive leader who repeatedly failed to negotiate a 
settlement with the Akali leadership during 1980-84. (2) 
Indira Gandhi was a Alachiavelllan leader who created a 
c r i s i s because she wanted to 'save' India and thus vdn 
2 
the next national elect ion. (3) Indira Gandhi was a 
power-hungry leader who repeatedly overcentralized the 
Indian polity and thus gave r i s e to numerous perverse 
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c e n t e r - s t a t e c o n f l i c t s , including the one involving 
3 
Punjab. The l a s t of these t h r e e , i s the most persuas ive , 
because i t bes t f i t s the evidence. However, an important 
objec t ion can be raised to a l l of the explanations tha t 
blame Indi ra Gandhi, whatever Ind i r a Gandhi d id , she did 
to many s t a t e s , not only to Punjab. V h^y, then, should 
Punjab have experienced more turmoi l than most other 
Indian s t a t e s ? 
A second l i n e of thinking on Punjab tends t o put 
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the blame on the Sikhs. Again, t h e r e have been several 
v a r i a t i o n s on the theme : ( I j The marriage of r e l i g i o n 
and p o l i t i c s i n Sikhism has c rea ted r ea l problems fo r 
democratic accommodation of a ' n a t i o n a l i s t ' c o n f l i c t . 
(2) Fact ional ism within the Akali par ty has made i t 
d i f f i c u l t t o find s ignif icant sikh leaders with whom to 
n e g o t i a t e . (3 ) The Sikh community i s bent oa imposing i t s 
wi l l on the Hindus. Elements of t h e s e themes, e spec ia l ly 
those concerning factionalism wi th in the Akali pa r ty , 
w i l l be incorporated in to a f u l l e r explanation. The 
marriage of r e l i g i o n and p o l i t i c s , fact ional ism among 
the Aka l i s , and the power urge of t he Sikhs as a community 
have a l l been around for qui te sometime, but the violence 
and the governmental breakdown have been ser ious only 
during the past decade. 
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A third l i ne of thought that appears to be more 
sensit ive to the issue of socio-economic changes seeks 
to isola te the economic origins of the conf l ic t . That 
argument points to the economic differentiation among 
the Sikhs, especially in the aftermath of the Green 
Revolution. Given these new economic differences, and the 
result ing ant ipathies , i t was di f f icul t for the Akali 
leadership to mobilize a l l the Sikhs to press even 
relat ively innocuous community demands. The escala t ion of 
militancy and the mounting separat is t demands should thus 
be seen from the standpoint of an attempt to crea te 
po l i t i ca l unity in a class-divided ethnic community. But 
these economic variables cannot be considered decis ive 
because the patterns of economic different iat ion in neigh-
bouring states l ike Haryana are not a l l that dif ferent 
from those in Punjab. If class conflicts deriving from 
the Green Revolutions, why are similar consequences not 
evident in Haryana ? 
The origins of Punjab's complex and t rag ic c iv i l 
disorder can be traced to the pol i t ica l Conflict between 
Indira Gandhi and the Akali Dal. In many respects , 
Indira Gandhi's a t ten^ts to keep the Akalis out of power 
a f te r 1980, and the Akalis* repeated attempts to win 
back Punjab, constituted a 'normal' pol i t ica l c o n f l i c t . 
That power struggle involving the Center and a regional 
party was not a l l that unusual. Indira Gandhi t r i ed to 
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maneuver severa l regional p a r t i e s out of power i n s t a t e s 
such as West Bengal and Andhra Pradesh. 
A number of fac tors , made the p o l i t i c a l s t ruggle 
in Punjab e s p e c i a l l y explosive. The f i r s t was t h a t Punjab 
was r e l a t i v e l y evenly divided between the Sikhs and the 
Hindus, a s i t u a t i o n v i r t ua l l y unique among I n d i a ' s s t a t e s . 
Second^the c lose l inkage of r e l i g i o n and p o l i t i c s i n 
Sikhism made i t d i f f i c u l t for the A k a l i s t o search for 
p o l i t i c a l support outside the Sikh community, pour other 
var iab les con t r ibu ted to the turmoil : (1) the weakness 
of the Akali Dal as a party; (2) some egregious p o l i t i c a l 
e r ro r s by Ind i ra Gandhi such as her support of the 
mi l i t an t r e l i g i o u s preacher Bhindaranwale and the m i l i t a r y 
assau l t on the Golden TenpleJ (3) a number of s o c i o -
economic cond i t i ons , such as the economic d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n s 
among the Sikhs, and t h e i r g rea te r p o l i t i c a l impact because 
of t h e i r inc reas ing wealth, and (4) the presence of large 
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numJoer of educated but unemployed Sikh youths. 
p r i o r t o the p o l i t i c a l turmoil t h a t a rose i n the 
1980s, cas te and conmunity d i v i s i o n s i n Punjab had given 
r i s e to eas i ly i d e n t i f i a b l e p o l i t i c a l d i v i s i o n s . In the 
p a s t , t h e Hindus general ly had supported the Congress 
par ty , though a s igni f icant minori ty had been loya l t o 
the Jan Sangh. The Akali Dal, by c o n t r a s t , had c o n s i s -
t e n t l y counted on the Sikh vote , but seldom had succeeded 
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i n mobilizing a l l the Sikhs as an ethnic p o l i t i c a l e n t i t y . 
The J a t s , espec ia l ly i n the southern d i s t r i c t s i had 
provided the main power base fo r t he Akalis i n Punjab. 
The Majhabis, however had seldom voted for the A k a l i s . 
Motivated by both cas t e and c l a s s animosit ies toward t h e i r 
employers, the J a t farmers, t h e Majhabis had tended t o 
support e i t h e r Congress or t he l e f t i s t p a r t i e s . The Bhapa 
Sikhs had a l so been p o l i t i c a l l y divided. Many of them 
had resented t h e i r loss of t h e Akali leadership i n the 
19i60s t o the up-and-coming Green Revolution J a t s . Some 
of t he urban Sikhs had formerly supported Congress, and 
others^ the Akali Oal . 
Given a l l these basic d i v i s i o n s , Congress, during 
the 1960s and 1970s, often had been in a pos i t ion t o 
form a government i n Punjab with the help of Hindus, 
Majhabi Sikhs, and urban Khatr i Sikhs. The Aka l i s , by 
c o n t r a s t , could form only a c o a l i t i o n government and 
t h a t only with the pro^iindu Jan Sangh. These p o l i t i c a l 
and community d iv i s ions provide the background e s s e n t i a l 
for urvderstanding the i n t e n s i f i e d p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t i e s 
of t he Akalis over the past decade. That mil i tancy was 
aimed a t mobilizing as many Sikhs as possible around 
a platform of 'Sikh na t iona l i sm ' . The Akali Dal as a 
p o l i t i c a l party has always exhibi ted a mixture of r e l i g i o n s 
fe rvor and hard-nosed p o l i t i c a l realism aimed a t captur ing 
8 power. 
The experience of the Akalis in and ou ts ide of 
the government dur ing 1967-71 had some in^or tan t p o l i t i c a l 
consequences. The f ac t t ha t the Akalis were i n a l l i a n c e 
with the Jan Sangh tended to soften both the pro-Sikh 
communal edge of t h e Akalis and the pro-Hindu s tance of 
the Jan Sangh. Thus, t he more extreme communal elements 
among both the Hindus and the Sikhs became a v a i l a b l e for 
p o l i t i c a l mob i l i za t ion . Congress sought to i nco rpora t e both 
of these extreme groups . The Congress strengthened i t s 
a l l i a n c e s with pro-Hindu groups, the more Congress i n 
Punjab came to t ake on a communal hue s imilar t o t h a t of 
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the Jan Sangh. However, i n a pecul ia r twis t t h a t revealed 
e l e c t o r a l opportunism run amok, Congress a l so encouraged 
the more extreme Sikh fac t ions within the A k a l i Dal to 
break away from t h e i r pa r ty . Congress 's temporary success 
on t h a t front ( e . g . the Lakshmi Singh Gi l l i n c i d e n t ) 
succeeded in toppl ing the Akali government i n t h e l a t e 
1960s. When tha t did not l a s t , and the Akalis again formed 
a ru l ing c o a l i t i o n , the game of overthrowing the government 
continued, leading up t o the imposition of p r e s i d e n t i a l 
r u l e in 1972. 
That s e r i e s of machinations by Congress made i t 
c l e a r to the Akal is t h a t Congress leaders would go to 
grea t lengths t o secure power i n Punjab : I f t h e Akal i s 
could mobilize Sikh support around pro-Sikh i s s u e s . 
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congress was j u s t as capable of p laying the communal game 
to achieve p o l i t i c a l ends. 
Vvhile Congress and t h e Akal i s continued t o mobilize 
and countermobil ize, using any means a t t h e i r d i s p o s a l , 
inc luding i n s t i g a t i o n of r e l i g i o u s warfare, Punjabi 
soc ie ty had been undergoing important changes. Because 
of the increas ing wealth of t he J a t farmers, t h e i r dona-
t i o n s to the gurdwaras, and thus the f inancial empire of 
the SGPC, rose enormcwsly. That increased the a b i l i t y 
of the Sikhs t o launch and s u s t a i n p o l i t i c a l movements. 
Increas ing personal wealth a l s o led t o rapid changes i n 
l i f e - s t y l e s . Growing consumerism, for eolample, th rea tened 
the cherished Sikh re l ig ious values of s i n p l i c i t y and 
asce t i c i sm. That opened the way for the more orthodox 
r e l i g i o u s l eade r s to spread t h e i r message. The Sikh 
r e l i g i o n was i n danger and had t o be defended aggre -
s s i v e l y . Increasing incomes and expenditures on consumer 
products bad brought communications technology, such as 
tape r ecorde r s , t o many Punjabi v i l l a g e s , and the recorded 
teachings of mi l i t an t preachers l i k e Bhindaranwale spread 
r a p i d l y . 
Vitiat f i n a l l y p r e c i p i t a t e d c o n f l i c t were p o l i t i c a l 
changes t ha t came a f t e r 1980. I t was in tha t year t h a t 
the Janata par ty d i s in teg ra ted n a t i o n a l l y , and Ind i ra 
Gandhi returned to power with a s i zab le majori ty , she 
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went on to dismiss many of the s t a t e governments con t ro l l ed 
by the opposition and to c a l l for new s t a t e e l e c t i o n s . The 
Akalis los t power i n t h a t nat ional shuffle for the t h i r d 
time in a l i t t l e over a decade. That must have l e f t them 
with a b i t t e r sense of having repeatedly been wronged by 
Indira Gandhi and Congress. In the 1980 s t a t e e l e c t i o n s , 
however, the Akalis won only 27 percent of the popular 
vo te . That must have confirmed for Indira Gandhi t h a t she 
indeed had a r igh t t o dismiss an elected government and 
to c a l l new e l e c t i o n s . 
She decided to use her pos i t ion of advantage t o 
launch a p o l i t i c a l offensive and consolidate her p o s i t i o n 
v i s - a - v i s the A k a l i s . I f she could use Bhindaranwale t o 
s p l i t the ranks of the Akalis s t i l l fur ther between the 
moderates and the e x t r e m i s t s , v ic tory would be h e r s . Her 
support for Bhindaranwale i n 1981 and 1982 - the per iod 
when she enjoyed cons iderable p o l i t i c a l advantage over 
the Akalis i n terms of pc^ular support. 
Both Indi ra Gandhi and the Akalis assembled 
mi l i t an t forces for p o l i t i c a l ends. Over the next several 
years , the mil i tancy led t o c i v i l disorder t h a t took on 
a p o l i t i c a l l i f e of i t s own, increasingly out of t h e 
cont ro l of both the Akal is and the national government. 
Whether that simply was not foreseen or was ignored under 
the short term pressure t o se ize p o l i t i c a l advantage may 
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never be known. However, Bhindaranwale turned aga ins t 
Congress, which had encouraged him and helped him t o 
become something of a cu l t hero . As a r e s u l t , Bhindaranwale 
began to c u l t i v a t e his own fol lowing. During 1981 and 
1982» Bhindaranwale increasingly took advantage of h i s 
popu la r i ty t o severe his l inks with Congress and t o enlarge 
h i s p o l i t i c a l base. The repeated f a i l u r e of the Akalis t o 
wrest power from Congress had l e f t them with the argument 
t h a t increased mili tancy was t he only means for p ro tec t ing 
Sikh i n t e r e s t s . 
As Bhindaranwale's popu la r i t y soared, the Akal is 
launched t h e i r own 'dharm yudh' or holy war in 1982. That 
movement was aimed at mobilizing Sikhs to force the 
na t iona l government to accede t o a se r i e s of demands, 
many of which had been spelled out i n the Anandpur Sahib 
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r e s o l u t i o n of 1973 - such as the t rans fe r of Chandigarh 
to Punjab, readjustment of i r r i g a t i o n a l loca t ion for 
some r i v e r waters , and an extension of the SGPC's cont ro l 
t o the gurdwaras outside Punjab, 
The f a i l u re of the negot ia t ions between Indi ra 
Gandhi and the Akalis during 1982-84 marked an important 
tu rn ing point i n the development of the Punjab c o n f l i c t . 
I t was during these two c ruc ia l years tha t the repeated 
i n a b i l i t y t o reach an agreement weakened the hold of the 
more moderate Sikh leaders over the regional n a t i o n a l i s t 
movement. 
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The Akalis had never been a united l o t . Their t h r e e 
prominent leaders* Badal, Tohra, and Longowal, came 
toge ther during t h a t per iod to bargain with Ind i ra Gandhi, 
but they also fought with each other , jockeying fo r 
p o s i t i o n within the p a r t y . Mili tancy, however, i n c r e a s i n g l y 
came to have i t s own dynamic. Bhindaranwale continued to 
be the t a c i t leader of those wil l ing to eniploy open 
violence to achieve the goal of grea ter autonomy for the 
Sikhs, including a more specif ic goal of some elements : 
t he c rea t ion of a sovereign s t a t e of Khal i s tan . The 
m i l i t a n t s na tura l ly were met with repress ion , which, 
combined with the charged appeals to r e l i g i o u s na t iona l i sm, 
gave r i s e to fur ther conf l ic t .The frightened Hindus jo ined 
the Congress, s t rengthening i t s p o l i t i c a l base. The Akal is 
thus found themselves being squeezed out of the p o l i t i c a l 
p rocess , by the m i l i t a n t Sikhs on one s ide and by I n d i r a ' s 
Congress on the o the r . 
This highly condensed account of those complex 
events makes two th ings c l e a r : F i r s t , the d r iv ing force 
behind the conf l ic t was a power s t ruggle between I n d i r a ' s 
Congress and the Akali Da l , Both Sikh nat ional ism and 
the increasing mi l i t ancy a re be te r understood as products 
r a t h e r than as source of the power s t rugg le . Second, 
because of the f a i l u r e t o achieve a negot ia ted se t t l ement 
during 1982-84, the l eade r sh ip of the movement began t o 
TO 
pass out of the hands of those who b a s i c a l l y vyanted to 
for 
win e lec t ion paving the way/militant forces to take 
control over the p o l i t i c a l a f fa i r s the s t a t e . 
The repeated f a i l u r e of negot ia t ions between Ind i r a 
and the Akali l e ade r s continued to swell the ranks of 
the m i l i t a n t s throughout 1983 and 1984. Under Bhindaran-
wale 's t a c i t l e ade r sh ip , many of them began using gurdwaras 
as sanc tua r i e s . The pnrominent leaders eventual ly made the 
Golden Temple, the most important of the Sikh gurdwaras, 
t h e i r base of ope ra t ions . Thus, the movement for i i k h 
autonomy increas ing ly came to resemble a theoxcra t ic 
fundamentalist movement, complete with i t s owri ' a y a t o l l a h s ' 
and zealous armed fol lowers, planned murders, as well as 
indiscr iminate k i l l i n g s , continued to mul t ip ly , Hindus 
were k i l l e d by the m i l i t a n t s so as to put pressure on 
the Congress government, Sikhs were k i l l e d so as t o 
minimize d issent within the cotmunity. I t was t h a t atmos-
phere t h a t led t o the imposition of p r e s i d e n t i a l ru le and 
l a t e r to a m i l i t a r y a s sau l t on the Golden Tenple i t s e l f . 
The Operation Blue Star and the subsequent even ts , 
including the a s sa s s ina t i on of Indira Gandhi by her own 
Sikh bodyguards and massacre of la rge number of Sikh in 
New Delhi and o ther places further added fuel to the 
Khalistan movement making democratic p o l i t i c s i n the 
s t a t e of Punjab unworkable. 
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By the time Rajive Gandhi took over the re igns of 
power Punjab had become the most important p o l i t i c a l 
i s sue i n India . Within s ix months a f t e r coming to power 
i n a Land sl ide e l ec to ra l v i c to ry , Rajive Gandhi, adapt ing 
a p o l i t i c a l l y r econc i l i a t a ry approach signed a nego-
t i a t e d agreement with the Akalii In t ha t Rajive gave 
i n t o v i r t u a l l y a l l the demands t h a t h is mother had 
r e j ec t ed during ear ly 1980*s. The accord was put 
toge the r i n haste without enough considerat ion of the 
enormous coii¥>lexity of i s sue s involved. I t did not 
address the issue of how to assuage the Sikhs sense of 
having been t rea ted un jus t ly . This i s not to suggest 
t h a t the Rajive-Longwal accord of July 1985 was not a 
major s tep in the d i r e c t i o n of discovering a democratic 
so lu t i on to the problem of Punjab. The accord fa i led 
t o resolve the Punjab problem. 
I t was agreed in the accord to t r ans f e r Chandigarh 
t o Punjab, to readjust some r i v e r i r r i g a t i o n waters i n 
favor of Punjab, and to widen the scope of the inqui ry 
13 i n t o the k i l l i ngs of Sikhs i n New Delhi , with those 
major demands of the Akal is met, the way was c l e a r t o 
resume a more normal p o l i t i c a l p rocess . I t was obvious 
t h a t a f t e r years of tu rmoi l , normalcy would not e a s i l y 
r e t u r n t o Punjab. And yet sinailtaneously i t was c l e a r 
t h a t holding e lec t ions and handing power over to the 
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Akalis was the best way, i f not the only way, to begin 
a long-term restorat ion of orderly government. That was 
certainly the new government's understanding. Thus, even 
Longowal's assassination by te r ror i s t s did not lead to 
Inspite of postponement of s t a t e elections./various obstacles, the 
elections went off peacefully, and as expected, the Akalis 
emerged victoriwjs. The turnout for the elections was 
extremely high, nearly 70 per cent of the Punjab e l ec -
to ra t e , which was higher than that in e i ther of the 
preceding state e lect ions (1977 and 1980). Considering 
the d i f f icu l t conditions within Punjab in the presence 
of a boycott ca l l given by te r ro r i s t s the par t ic ipa t ion 
ra te must be viewed as a rejection of the more extreme 
demand ( e . g . , for Khalistan) and of the extraconst i tut ional 
po l i t i ca l s t ra tegies adopted by the mi l i tan ts . The 
resumption of the p o l i t i c a l process led to a remarkable 
decline in terrorism. 
Early attempts by the Rajiv government to res tore 
democratic po l i t i ca l order in Punjab were not sustained. 
The fai lure undermined the position of the Akali govern-
ment, encouraged ter ror ism, and paved the way for the 
mil i tants to assume posit ions of pol i tcal prominence. 
The Akalis formed a government in Punjab under aarnala ' s 
leadership in October 1985. Within the f i r s t three months 
of his ru le , Barnala found himself po l i t i ca l ly pressed on 
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several s i d e s . His most immediate problem was "the fac -
t i o n a l ! zed leadersh ip of his own pa r ty , v»hat made the 
s i t u a t i o n e spec i a l l y precarious for liarnala were two other 
contextual va r i ab le s : a renewal of t e r r o r i s m , and f a i l u r e 
of the Rajiv government to implement the accord. 
The date announced for the t r a n s f e r of Chandigarh 
to Punjab was January 26, 1986. I t was not c lea r u n t i l t he 
l a s t minute tha t c r u c i a l clause of the accord would not 
be implemented. The Barnala government even issued 
i n v i t a t i o n s to ce l eb ra t e the t r a n s f e r . On the evening 
of January 25, however, word reached Chandigarh t h a t the 
date of t r a n s f e r had been postponed t o March. When the 
March da te came and went without the t r a n s f e r of Chandigarh, 
i t was c l e a r tha t the Rajiv government had reneged on i t s 
agreement. Or»ce t h a t decis ion was made, much of the 
Punjab accord was doomed. The more i t became c lear t ha t 
c ruc i a l c lauses of the accord were not going to be 
implemented, the more pressed Barnala f e l t p o l i t i c a l l y 
within Punjab. Barna la ' s approval r a t i n g depended heavily 
on h is cont inuing capaci ty to e l i c i t b e n e f i t s for Punjab 
from New Delhi . New De lh i ' s f a i lu re t o implement the 
accord weakened Barnala. As a r e s u l t , both fact ional ism 
among the Akaii l eade r s and terror ism i n t e n s i f i e d . The 
p o l i t i c a l approach slowly gave way to law and order 
approach or use of force approach. 
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As the law-and-order approach f a i l ed to ialng 
te r ror i sm under con t ro l , many conpeting groups with 
unclear goals began to crop up. some of those groups 
proclaimed t h e i r goal to be the c r e a t i o n of a sovereign 
s t a t e of Khal i t t an , and to tha t end they were willing to 
k i l l as many Hindus as necessary to d r ive a l l Hindus out 
of Punjab. Other groups were l ess c l e a r about their 
eventual goa l s , they sought to avenge what they perceived 
to be the i n s u l t s v i s i t ed on the Sikhs by New Delhi. 
Mi l i tant groups of both types were w i l l i n g to k i l l not 
only Hindus but a l so other Sikhs. Continuing terrorism 
and rampant factionalism among the Akal is further weakened 
the Barnala government. Many of the Akali leaders were 
afraid of the t e r r o r i s t s and simply refused to speak out 
against them.As the mi l i t an t s recongregated in the Golden 
Temple, Barnala a l so was forced to send i n the police, 
thui> fu r the r a l i ena t ing many in the Sikh community. 
Barnala ' s more mil i tant r i v a l , Tohra, won the 
e lec t ions to head the SGPC, thus demonstrat ing the growing 
p o l i t i c a l s ignif icance of the m i l i t a n t s . The newly appointed 
mi l i t an t p r i e s t s even sought to dis lodge Barnala from his 
pos i t i on . Barnala 's government survived, but only with 
the support of Congress l e g i s l a t o r s . Barnala had been 
reduced t o a token leader in Punjab, kept on i n power by 
New Delhi . By con t ras t , the re l ig ious organizations that 
underpinned the power of the Akali pa r ty increasingly came 
/o 
under the control of the m i l i t a n t s , Rajiv f i na l ly d i s -
missed the Barnala government and imposed p r e s i d e n t i a l r u l e 
on Punjab i n May 1987. 
The imposition of p re s iden t i a l rule did not make 
much difference for the everyday processes of government 
in Punjab. Terrorism cont inued, and many of the m i l i t a n t s 
were again operating out of the Golden Temple. The 
s i t u a t i o n in mid-1988 increas ing ly came to resemble t h a t 
p reva i l ing before Operation Bluestar in 1984, when p r e s i -
d e n t i a l ru le had been in e f fec t and the t e r r o r i s t s had 
been i n control of the Golden Ten^le. The Akalis had l o s t 
v i r t u a l l y a l l c r e d i b i l i t y by 1988. The m i l i t a n t s , by 
c o n t r a s t , were the only force with whom the government 
could d e a l . All t h i s encouraged fac t ional c o n f l i c t s 
wi th in the Akali pa r ty , fu r the r legi t imised the m i l i t a n t s 
and d i sc red i t ed the moderate Akali l e ade r s , and rendered 
e lec ted governments i n e f f e c t i v e and weak i n the eyes of 
public and mi l i tan ts as w e l l . This a l l turned Punjab i n t o 
a testimony to I n d i a ' s growing problems of gove rnab i l i t y . 
Due to the f a i l u r e of the Government of India t o 
continue i t s p o l i t i c a l approach towards the r e s o l u t i o n 
of Punjab problem adopted by Rajiv Gandhi when he took 
over the reigns of e r i n a landsl id e l e c t o r a l v i c to ry 
in 1985 the violence i n the state continued unabated only 
to be combated by harsh secur i ty measures involving 
76 
army^ pa ra -mi l i t a ry forces and other law enforcing agencies 
of the s t a t e . Punjab a f t e r over a decade of violence 
appear t o move towards the normalcy paving the way for 
p o l i t i c a l process to be i n i t i a t e d . 
General Assembly e lec t ions were held i n 1992. 
However flawed and skewed the general percept ion about 
the e l e c t i o n was tha t a t l e a s t , t he r e was recommencement 
of the p o l i t i c a l process as opposed t o an imposed and 
adhoc governance. Elections were boycotted by Akal is . 
This resul ted i n the loss of Akali Dal to r eas se r t i t s 
p o l i t i c a l and organisat ional relevance i n the s t a t e of 
Punjab, thereby helping the Congress t o remerge on the 
p o l i t i c a l scene of Punjab where i t s presence had almost 
become e x t i n c t . 
This i n i t i a t i o j i p o l i t i c a l process gradually 
progressed towards more s tab le and normal exis tence. 
Though the i n i t i a t i o n of p o l i t i c a l process helped i n 
bringing mil i incy and violence to normalcy but i t was not 
completely crushed or suppressed or died down. Sporadic 
incidence of violence continued. M i l i t a n t continue t o 
regroup themselves to make t h e i r presence f e l t by 
re so r t ing t o violence. The a s sa s s ina t i on of Mi, Beant 
Singh Congress Chief Minister of Punjab i n 1996, recent 
explosion i n a t r a i n and the p l a n t a t i o n of a bomb i n a 
Hindu Temple are the poin ters towards the point t h a t 
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militancy in Punjab can reeraerge given the opportunity 
which exsisted during the l a s t decade mainly as a r e s u l t 
of power p o l i t i c s of Congress and Akali p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s , 
> > » > » 
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C O N C L U S I O N 
Punjab underwent a decade of mi l i tancy and violence 
due to combination of various reasons and causes . This 
problem was the progeny of soc io -econon ic -pp l i t i co - re l ig ious 
fac to rs , having roots both in p r e - and post-independence 
his tory of I n d i a . 
Sikh r e l i g i o n considers p o l i t i c s as inseparable 
part i t . More so^militancy was injected i n t o i t since the 
days of Guru Govind Singh. The r e l i g ious i d e n t i t y was 
exploited by the Br i t i she r s to give t h e « p o l i t i c a l iden-
t i t y . I t was a l so used for p o l i t i c a l expediency even a f t e r 
independence. The problems of Sikhs were not properly 
attended and s e t t l e d . The issue of t h e i r language and Sikh 
dominated s t a t e were highly p o l i t i c i s e d t o assume heavy 
communal over tones , giving b i r t h t o power p o l i t i c s in the 
s t a t e between Congress, Akali Dal and Jan Sangh. 
Congress played the game of divide and rule with 
Sikh l e a d e r s h i p . Sikh leadership in the process very e f fec-
t ive ly a r t i c u l a t e d Sikh grievances for p o l i t i c a l expediency. 
Akali Dal (dominated by rich Sikh peasan t ry ; remained 
somewhat r e s t r a i n e d when in power as pa r t of various 
c o a l i t i o n s and became communal when in oppos i t ion . The 
same was t r u e to some extent of the Congress. The p o l i t i c a l 
patronage given to a fundamentalist Sant Bhindaranwale 
with the i n t e n t i o n of dividing the Akali l eadersh ip 
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boanraiiq,e€l-» thereby encouragirig Sikh extranisni and 
mi l i tancy , 
such a ro le of Congress in the s t a t e continuously 
eroded the moderate Sikh leadership r e su l t i ng in to violence 
and mil i tancy on the one hand and increasing fragmentation 
of Sikh p o l i t i c s and the v i r t u a l breakdown of s ta te 
government as well on the other hand. The repeated impo-
s i t i o n s of Pres ident r u l e s ref lected the p o l i t i c a l stalemate 
and increasing involvement of the cen t ra l government in 
the s t r i f e - r i d d e n s t a t e of Punjab, In the process Sikh 
r e l i g i o s i t y was imparted communal overtones by Akalis 
and Congress l eadersh ip for p o l i t i c a l mileage with extreme 
manifestat ion of t h i s being the a r t i c u l a t i o n of the urges 
of Sikhs to be recognised as d i s t inc t ethnic community 
and t o enjoy p o l i t i c a l r i g h t s on that bas i s i n t he i r own 
r i g h t s , which gave b i r t h to the demand of Khal i s tan . 
This aggravated the communal divide i n Punjab, 
V^hile the Akali Dal did not oppose mi l i t ancy , Jan Sangh 
demanded the use of army for curbing the growing v io lence . 
S imi lar ly , the Akali Dal vehemently opposed <iperation 
Blue Star and other such ac t ions undertaken by the Cent ra l 
government from time t o t ime, Jan Sangh defended these 
s teps with the r e s u l t t h a t both the communities Punjabis 
and Hindu acted and reacted frcm perceived pos i t ions as 
threatened m.inorit ies l a r g e l y created by p o l i t i c a l e l i t e s 
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for p o l i t i c a l expendiency. Sikh and Hindu i d e n t i t i e s as 
a consequence became more s a l i e n t than Punjabi or Indian 
i d e n t i t i e s . 
The i n a b i l i t y of t he government to tackle the 
problem with a c lear v is ion and understanding of the 
s i t u a t i o n , i t s various dimensions and factors contr ibuted 
t o the growth of mil i tancy and violence in the s t a t e . 
Government, in fac t , mishandled the prcA)lem r ight from the 
beginning. The strategy of t he government was simply based 
on the use of force, which probably intended to vanish 
the t e r r o r i s t s not the causes which led to such choatic 
and v i o l e n t s i tua t ion in Punjab. The use of force s t r a t egy 
was not even well coordinated and executed. I t was not 
l e a r n t by the government of India frcxn the experiences 
tha t nowhere repressive measures were successful in 
t ack l ing the problan of mi l i t ancy and te r ro r i sm. 
The Punjab problem was not dea l t properly 
with a c l e a r p o l i t i c a l v i s i o n . P o l i t i c a l ambitions of the 
then ru l ing party (Congress) i n Delhi were of prime c o n s i -
dera t ion for i t than the na t iona l i n t e r e s t s . Rajiv Gandhi 
a f t e r taking over the re ings of power a t tenpted to 
resolve the conf l ic t by signing an agreement with A k a l i s . 
He himself could not implement the ..greement. This encouraged 
fac t iona l conf l i c t s within Akali pa r ty , legit imised the 
m i l i t a n t s , d iscredi ted the moderate Akali leaders and 
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rendered the elected government weak and inef fec t ive m 
the eyes of public and m i l i t a n t s as w e l l . This further 
contr ibuted t o the mil i tancy and violence in Punjab only 
to be t ack led with harsh security measures, paving the 
way for assembly e lect ions in 1992. This was the commen-
cement of a p o l i t i c a l process as opposed t o an imposed and 
adhoc governance. This put Punjab on the t r ack of s t a b i l i t y 
and noiraalcy, 
Punjab conf l ic t was i n f ac t , a p o l i t i c a l conf l ic t 
that had t r ans fe r r ed i t s e l f i n to an e thnic warfare for 
an ethnic homeland. The dr iving force behind the Punjab 
problem was power struggle between congress and Akali Dal . 
Sikh nat ional ism and mili tancy were the products ra ther 
than the source of power s t rugg le . Due a t t e n t i o n to the 
problems of Sikhs by the government would have hardly 
developed i n t o such an explosive and emotive manifestation 
of the problem. Not only t h i s , the power s t ruggle a l so 
resu l ted i n t o the weakening of the myriad p o l i t i c a l 
i n s t i t u t i o n s and in the process decaying of them. Though 
the s t a t e of Punjab i s back t o normalcy sporadic i n c i -
dence of v iolence are s t i l l cont inuing. Given the 
opportunity as existed during the beginning of the l a s t 
decade t he exis t ing s i tua t ion may again t u r n chaotic 
and tu rbu lence . 
A P P E N D I X - A 
ANANDPUR SAHIB RESOLUTION 1977 
AmNDPUR SAHIB RESOLUTION 1977 
May the Panth Prevai l May the victory by ever 
with the Panth 
FOREWORD 
The Shiroraani Akali ual undoubtedly, i s a great 
o rgan i s a t i on whose coming i n t o existence has been a matter 
of p r i d e for the Sikhs. I t s e n t i r e h is tory i s a glor ious 
record of s t ruggles and a g i t a t i o n s , v i c t o r i e s and achieve-
ments of which i t can be j u s t l y proud of. The past record 
of t he pa r ty vouchsafes t ha t whsoever has ever t r i ed to 
confront i t , he did have to per ish u l t imate ly . The most 
momentous pa r t played by i t i n the Freedom Struggle of 
the country would ever form an i n d e l i b l e par t of h i s to ry 
w r i t t e n i n l e t t e r s of gold. 
Shiromani Akali Dal has been guiding the Sikhs 
according to exigencies of the s i t u a t i o n for the i r r i g h t s 
and for a respectable s t a tus i n the set-up of the country. 
I t s ob jec t ive has been e x a l t a t i o n of the Sikh Panth and 
for the achievement of t h i s l o f ty idea l Shiromani Akali 
Dal has been adopting d i f f e r en t and varied means. 
seeping in view the an t i -S ikh po l i c i e s of the 
Congress government and the p o l i t i c a l , so(tial and economic 
*The New pol icy Programme of the Shiromani Akali Dal 
adopted by i t s working Committee a t i t s meeting held a t 
Sr i Anandpur Sahib on 16-17 October, 1973 to ba approved 
by the General House of the Akali ual at i t s Session a t 
Ludhiana on 28.8.1977. 
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condit ions pu l sa t ing in the country, the Shiromani Akali 
Dal has decided to redraw the aims and objec t ives of the 
Sikh panth and to give a more vigorous lead for t h e i r a c h i -
evements so t ha t by so doing i t may serve the larger i n t e r e s t s 
of the Panth, the Punjab as also the Country and thus l i v e 
upto the expecta t ions of the Sikhs. 
For such a purpose, a sub-committee of the Sikh 
in te - i l ec tua l s and th inkers was formed by the Shiromani 
Akali Dal a t a meeting of i t s i.orking Committee held on 
11-12-1972 t o draw up the draf t of a ' p o l i c y programme', 
with the uenera l Secretary of the p a r t y , S. Surj i t Singh 
aarnala , as i t s Ch"irraan, and S. Gurcharan Singh Tohra, 
M.P., p r e s i d e n t , Shiromani Gurdwara parbandhak Ccximittee, 
Jathedar Jiwan Singh Umranangal, S. Gurmit Singh, ex-minis te r . 
Dr. ahagat Singh, ex-minis ter , S. alawant Singh, ex-Finance 
Canis ter , S. Gian Singh Rarewala, S. Prem Singh Lalpura, 
S. Jaswinder Singh dra r , General Secre tary , Shiromani 
Akali Dal, S. Bhag Singh, ex-M.L.A., Major General Gurbux 
Singh Badhni and S. Amar Singh Arabalvi, Advocate, as i t s 
members. 
This Sub-Committee had eleven s i t t i n g s beginning 
with the f i r s t a t Amritsar, on 23-12.1972. Most of the 
meetings were held a t Chandigarh for i t s peaceful and 
congenial atmosphere. 
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All the members of the sub-commit t e e evinced keen 
i n t e r e s t i n i t s working and engaged themselves in very 
i n t e r e s t i n g and useful d iscuss ions which were a t r e a t t o 
watch and partake of, A unanimous report was u l t imate ly 
drawn up a f t e r very c lose de l ibe ra t ions on each and every 
aspect of the matters and more subtle of t h e i r a spec t s . 
Actuated by feelings of love for the Sikh Panth, more of 
i t s eminent Army Generals . Legal experts , Doctors, p o l i t i c a l 
t h i n k e r s , experienced p o l i t i c i a n s and r e l i g i o u s l eaders joined 
toge ther t o lend t h e i r helping hands to draw up t h i s plan 
for a more glorious fu ture of the panth. During t h e i r d i s -
cussions a very happy balance of love for the panth and the 
Country was a l l too ev iden t , as also the keenness to s a f e -
guard the i n t e r e s t s of the Sikhs and the Country, 
V<hen the met iculously drawn up repor t of S, Su r j i t 
Singh Sub-committee was presented in the meeting of the 
working committee of Shiromani Akali Dal held at Shri 
Anandpur Sahib, the sacred and his tor ic seat of the Tenth 
Lord, i t was approved, a f t e r close discuss ions extending 
over two aays, for p lacing i t before the General House. 
This draft i s , t he re fo re , begin sent to you to 
enable you to study i t i n depth a so tha t the meeting of 
the General House may be benefi ted by your valued opinion, 
v^ath Panthic Love and regards. 
Office of Yours humbly, 
1 R 1Q77 Secretary 
^•^••^^' '* Shiromani Alcali Dal 
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TH£ RESOLUTIONS 
adopted, i n the l i gh t of t he Anandpur Sahib Resolution, a t 
the open session of the 18th All Irxiia Akali Conference 
held a t Ludhiana on 28-29 October, 1978 under the P r e s i -
den tsh ip of Jathedar Jagdev Singh Talwandi are as under : 
( I t was af ter the passing of these Resolutions t h a t 
the Shiromani Akali Dal s t a r t e d the s truggle t h e r e f o r . ) 
RESOLUTION NO. 1 
Moved by S. Gurcharan Singh Tohra, President Shiromani 
Gurdwara parbandhak Committee and endorsed by S. Parkash 
Singh Badal, Chief Minis ter , Punjab. 
The Shiromani Akali Dal r ea l i z e s tha t India i s a 
federal and republican geographical en t i ty of d i f ferent 
languages, re l igions and c u l t u r e s . To safeguard the funda-
mental r i g h t s of the r e l i g i o u s and l i n g u i s t i c minor i t i e s , 
t o f u l f i l the demands of the democratic t r a d i t i o n s and 
to pave the way for economic progress , i t has become 
i r tpera t ive tha t the Indian cons t i t u t i ona l i n f r a s t ruc tu re 
should be given a rea l federa l shape by redefining the 
c e n t r a l and s ta te r e l a t i ons and r i g h t s on the l ines of 
the aforesaid pr inciples and objec t ives . 
The concept of t o t a l revolut ion given by Lok Naik, 
Sh. Jayaprakash Narain i s a l so based upon the progressive 
decen t r a l i za t i on of powers. The climax of the process of 
c e n t r a l i z a t i o n of powers of the s t a t e s through repeated 
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amendments of the Const i tu t ion during the Congress regime 
came before the countrymen in the form of the Emergency, 
when a l l fundamental r ights of a l l c i t i z e n s were usurped. 
Itwas then tha t the programme of d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n of powers 
ever advocated by Shiromani Akali Dal was openly accepted 
and adopted by other p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s including Janata 
pa r ty , C . P . I . (M) , A.U.ra.is. e t c . 
Shiromani Akali ual has ever stood firm on t h i s 
p r i nc ip l e and that i s why a f t e r very ca re fu l considerat ions 
i t unanimously adopted a resolu t ion to t h i s effect f i r s t 
a t a l l India Akali Conference, a a t a l a , then at Sri Anandpur 
Sahib v/hich has endorsed the p r inc ip le of S ta te autonomy 
in keeping with the concept of Federalism, 
As such, the Shiromani Akali ijal emphatically urges 
upon the Janta Government to take cognizance of the d i f f e ren t 
l i n g u i s t i c and cul tura l sect ions , r e l i g i o u s minori t ies as 
also the voice of mill ions of people and recas t the cons-
t i t u t i o n a l s t ructure of the country on r e a l and meaningful 
federal p r inc ip l e s to obviate the p o s s i b i l i t y of any danger 
to National uni ty and the i n t e g r i t y of the country and 
fu r ther , to enable the s t a t e s to play a useful role for 
the progress and prosperity of the Indian people in t h e i r 
respec t ive areas by the meaningful exerc i se of the i r powers. 
RESOLUTION NO. 2 
The momentous meeting of the Shiromani Akali ual 
c a l l s upon the Government of India t o examine carefully the 
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long t a l e of the excesses , wrongs, i l l e g a l ac t ions committed 
by the previous Congress government, more p a r t i c u l a r l y 
during Emergency, and t ry t o find an early so lu t ion t o the 
follovdng problems : 
( a ) Chandigarh o r i g i n a l l y raised as a c a p i t a l for Punjab 
should be handed over t o Punjab. 
(b) The long s tanding demand of the Shiroraani Akali Dal 
for the merger i n Punjab of the Punjabi speaking 
a reas , to be i den t i f i ed by l ingu i s t i c exper t s with 
v i l l age as a u n i t , should be conceded, 
(c ) The control of Head Works should continue t o be vested 
in Punjab and, i f need be, the Reorganisation Act 
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should be amended. 
(d) The a r b i t r a r y and unjust Award given by Mrs. Indira 
Gandhi during the Emergency on the d i s t r i b u t i o n of 
riavi-Beas v/aters should be revised on the un iversa l ly 
accepted norms arxl p r i n c i p l e s , thereby j u s t i c e be 
done to Punjab, 
(e ) Keeping in view the special aptitude and mar t ia l 
qua l i t i e s of the Sikhs the present r a t i o of t h e i r 
strength in Army should be maintained, 
( f ) The excesses being committed on the s e t t l e r s in the 
Tarai region of U,? . i n the name of Land Reforms 
should be vacated by making suitable amendments in 
the Cei l ing Law on the Central gu ide l ines . 
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RS30LUTIUN NO. 3 
(Economic Policy Resolution) 
The chief sources of i n s p i r a t i o n of the economic 
p o l i c i e s and programme of the Shiromani Akali Dal are the 
s ecu l a r , democratic and s o c i a l i s t i c corK;epts of Sr i 
Nanak Dev and Sri Guru Gobind Singh J i , Our Economic 
prograrrane i s based on th ree basic pr inciples : 
(a) uignity of Labour. 
(b) An economic and social structure which provides for 
the uplift of the poor and depressed sections of 
society, 
( c ) Unabated opposition t o concentration of economic 
and p o l i t i c a l power i n the hands of the c a p i t a l i s t s . 
While draf t ing i t s economic pol ic ies and programme, 
t he Shiromani Akali Dal in i t s h i s t o r i c Anandpur Sahib 
r e s o l u t i o n has la id p a r t i c u l a r s t r e s s on the need t o break 
the monopolistic hold of the c a p i t a l i s t s foisted on the 
Indian economy by 30 years of Congress rule i n I n d i a , This 
c a p i t a l i s t hold enabled the c e n t r a l government to assume 
a l l powers in i t s hands a f t e r the manner of Mughal 
Imperial ism, This was bound t o thwart the economic 
progress of the s t a t e s and in ju re the social and economic 
i n t e r e s t s of the people. The Shiromani Akali Dal once 
again r e i t e r a t e s the Sikh way of l i f e by resolving to 
f u l f i l the holy words of Guru Nanak Dev : 
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'He alone r e a l i z e s the Truce Path who labours honestly 
and shares the f r u i t s of tha t Labour ' , 
This way of l i f e i s based upon t h r e e basic p r i n c i p l e s ; 
( i ; Doing honest labour, 
( i i ) Sharing the f ru i t s of t h i s labour, and 
( i i i ) Meditat ion on the Lord 's Name, 
The Shiromani Akali Dal c a l l s upon the Central and 
the Sta te governments to e rad ica te unemployment during 
the next ten y e a r s . V*hile pursuing t h i s aim, specia l 
emphasis should be laid on amel iorat ing the l o t of the 
weaker s e c t i o n s , Scheduled and depressed c l a s s e s , workers, 
l andless and poor farmers and urban poor. Minimum wages 
should be fixed for them a l l . 
The Shiromani Akali Dal urges upon the Punjab 
Government to draw up such an economic plan for t he State 
as would tu rn i t i n to the leading province during the next 
ten years , by r a i s i n g per capi ta income to Rs. 3,000 
and by generat ing an economic growth r a t e of 7-/. per annum 
as against 4/. a t National l e v e l . 
The Shiromani Akali Dal gives f i r s t p r i o r i t y to 
the redraf t ing of the taxat ion s t ruc tu r e i n such a way 
tha t the burden of taxat ion i s shi f ted from the poor to 
the r i cher c l a s s e s and an equi tab le d i s t r i b u t i o n of 
nat ional income i s ensured. 
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The main plank of the economic programme of the 
t o 
Shiromani Akali Dal i s /enab le the economically weaker 
sections of the Society to share the f r u i t s of National 
income. 
The Shiromani Akali Dal c a l l s upon the Centra l 
Government to make an in te rna t iona l a i r - f i e l d a t Amritsar 
which should a l so enjoy the f a c i l i t i e s of a dry p e r t . 
Similarly, a Stock Exchange should be opened a t Ludhiana 
to accelera te the process of i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n and economic 
growth in the S t a t e . The Shiromani Akali Dal a l so des i res 
tha t su i tab le amendments should be made i n the Foreign 
Exchange ru les for free exchange of foreign cur renc ies and 
thereby removing the d i f f i c u l t i e s being faced by the 
Indian emigrants . 
The Shiromani Akali Dal emphatically urges upon the 
Indian Government t o bring a pa r i ty between the p r i ces of 
the ag r i cu l t u r a l produce and tha t of the i n d u s t r i a l raw 
materials so t h a t the discr iminat ion agains t such s t a t e s 
which lack these mater ia ls may be removed. 
The Shiromani Akali Dal demands tha t the exp lo i t a t ion 
of the producers of the cash crops l i ke c o t t o n , sugarcane, 
o i l seeds e t c . a t the hands of the t r ade r s should be 
stopped forthwith and for such a purpose arrangements for 
the purchase of these crops by the government, a t 
remunerative p r i c e s , should be made, i^esides, ef fect ive 
steps should be taken by the government for the purchase 
of cotton through the Cotton Corporation. 
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The Shiromani Akali Dal strongly feels t ha t the 
most pressing National problem i s the need to ameliorate 
the l o t of mil l ions of exploited persons belonging t o 
t he scheduled c l a s s e s . For such a purpose the Shiromani 
Akali Dal c a l l s upon the Cent ra l and State Governments 
t o earmark special funds. Besides, the State Governments 
should a l l o t su f f i c ien t funds i n the i r respect ive budgets 
fo r giving free r e s i d e n t i a l p l o t s both in the urban and 
r u r a l areas to the scheduled c a s t e s . 
The Shiromani Akali Dal a l so ca l l s for the rapid 
d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n of farming. The shortcomings i n t he Land 
Reforms Laws should be removed, rapid i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n 
of the State ensured, the c r e d i t f a c i l i t i e s for t h e medium 
i n d u s t r i e s expanded and unen^loyment allowance given t o 
those who are unemployed. For remunerative farming, 
pe rcep t ib l e reduction should be made on the p r i c e s of farm 
machinery l ike t r a c t o r s , tube-wel ls as also :he i n p u t s , e t c . 
RESOLirriON NO. 4 
This huge session of the Shiromani Akali Dal r eg re t s 
the discr iminat ion to which the Punjabi language i s 
being subjected in the adjoining States of Himachal, 
Haryana, Delhi and jammu and Kashmir, e t c . I t i s i t s 
firm demand that i n accordance with the Nehru Language 
Formula, the neighbouring s t a t e s of Punjab should be 
' g iven second' language s t a t u s to the Punjabi language 
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because a f a i r l y large sec t ions of t h e i r respect ive 
populat ion are Punjabi-speaking, 
HESQLUTION NO. 5 
The meeting regrets t h a t aga ins t the ' c la ims ' of 
the refugees who had migrated t o Jaramu and ..ashmir as a 
r e s u l t of the p a r t i t i o n of the country, no compensation 
has been provided to them even a f t e r such a long time 
and these unfortunate refugees a r e ro t t ing in the camps 
ever s ince then. 
This Akali Dal Session, t he re fo re , forceful ly demands 
t h a t t h e i r claims should be soon se t t l ed and immediate 
s teps should be taken to rehab i l i t a te ibem even i f i t 
involves an amendmeht in Section 370, 
RESOLUTION NO. 6 
The 18th Session of the All India Akali Conference 
t akes s t rong exceptions to the d iscr iminat ion to which 
the minor i t i e s in other s t a t e s a r e being subjected and 
the way i n which t h e i r i n t e r e s t s are being ignored. 
As such, i t demands tha t i n j u s t i c e against the Sikhs 
i n other "s tates should be vacated and proper represen-
t a t i o n should be given to them i n the government service , 
l o c a l bod ies , s t a t e l e g i s l a t u r e s , through nomination, 
i f need b e . 
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RESOLUTION NO. 7 
The 18th Session of the All India Akali Conference 
notes with s a t i s f a c t i o n tha t mechanization of fanning in 
the country has led to increase in the farm yie ld and 
as a r e s u l t the country i s heading towards se l f -
suff ic iency. 
However, the session fee l s t ha t poor farmers are 
unable to take t o mechanization because of the enormity 
of the cost involved. 
As such, t h e Shiromani Akali Dal urges upon the 
Government of India to abolish the excise duty on t r a c t o r s 
so that with the decrease in t h e i r p r ices the ordinary 
farmers may a l so be able to avai l of farm machinery and 
contr ibute t o the grov/th of gross a g r i c u l t u r a l produce of 
the country. 
RESOLUTION NO. 8 
The meeting of the Shiromani Akali Dal appeals to 
the Central and S t a t e Governments t o pay p a r t i c u l a r 
a t t en t ion t o the poor and labouring c lasses and demands 
t h a t besides making sui table amendments i n the fvUnimum 
Vvages Act, su i t ab l e legal steps should be taken t o improve 
the economic l o t of the labouring c l a s s t o enable i t to 
lead a respectable l i f e and play a useful r o l e i n the 
rapid i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n of the country. 
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RESOLUTION NO. 9 
This sess ion seeks permission from the Government 
of India to i n s t a l a broadcasting s tat ion a t Golden 
Temple, Amritsar, for the re lay of 'Gurbani K i r t an ' for 
the s p i r i t u a l s a t i s f a c t i o n of those Sikhs who are l i v ing 
i n foreign lands . 
The session wishes to make i t clear t h a t t he 
e n t i r e cost of the proposed broadcasting p ro jec t would 
be borne by the Khalsa panth and i t s over-a l l con t ro l 
sha l l vest with the Indian Government, v.e have every 
hope that the government would have no h e s i t a t i o n in 
conceding t h i s demand a f t e r due considerat ion, 
RESOLUTION NO. 10 
The huge Session of the Shiremani Akali Dal strongly 
urges upon the Government of India to make necessary 
amendments in the following enactments for the bene f i t s 
of the a g r i c u l t u r a l c lasses who have to i led hard for the 
l a r g e r National i n t e r e s t s : 
1 . 3y su i tab le amendment in the relevant c lause of the 
Hindu Succession Act, a woman should be given r i gh t s 
of inher i tance in the proper t ies of her f a t h e r - i n -
law instead of the f a t h e r ' s . 
2 . The a g r i c u l t u r a l lands of the farmers should be 
completely exempted from the Wealth Tax and the 
Estate Duty, 
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RESQLirriQN NO. 11 
The vast Session of the Shiromani Akali Dal strongly 
impresses upon t h e Government of India t h a t keeping in 
view the economic backwardness of the scheduled and non-
scheduled cas tes provis ions proport ionate t o t h e i r 
population should be made in the budget for u t i l i z a t i o n 
for t h e i r wel fare . A special ministry shoula be created 
a t the centre as a p r a c t i c a l measure to render j u s t i c e 
t o them on the b a s i s of rese rva t ion . 
The Session a l so c a l l s upon the government tha t 
i n keeping with t h e settlement already no discr iminat_on 
should be made between the Sikh and Hindu Har i jans in any 
pa r t of the count ry , 
RESaUTION NO. 12 
The congress government i s cal led upon to vacate 
the gross i n j u s t i c e , d iscr iminat ion done t o Punjab in the 
d i s t r i b u t i o n of Ravi-3eas waters . The Cent ra l Government 
must a lso give approval for the immediate establishment 
of six sugar and four t e x t i l e mi l l s in Punjab so tha t 
the s ta te may be ab le to implement i t s a g r o - i n d u s t r i a l 
po l icy . 
3ASIC POSTULATES OF THE SHIROMANI AKALI DAL 
As adopted by the kvorking Committee of the ihiromani 
Akali Dal a t i t s meeting held at Sri Anandpur Sahib on 
16-17 October, 1973. 
9S 
(A ) p o s t u l a t e s 
1 . The Shiromani Akali Dal i s the very embodiment of 
the hopes and a s p i r a t i o n s of the Sikh Nation and as 
such i s ful ly e n t i t l e d t o i t s representa t ion . The 
basic postula tes of t h i s organisat ion are Human 
Co-exis tence, Human progress and ul t imate unity 
of a l l Human beings with t he Spi r i tua l Soul. 
2. These postula tes a re based upon the three great 
p r inc ip l e s of s r i Guru Nanak Dev J i , namely, a 
Meditation onGod's Name, d ign i ty of labour and 
sharing of f ru i t s of t h i s Labour. 
(Nam Japo, Kir at Karo, Viand Chhako) 
(.3 ) Purposes 
The shiromani Akali Dal s h a l l ever s t r i ve to achieve 
the following aims : 
1. propagation of Sikhism and i t s code of conduct 
denounciation of a theism. 
2. To preserve and keep a l i v e the concept of d i s t i n c t 
and indepenaent i d e n t i t y of the panth and to 
c r ea t e an envirc^iment i n which national sentiments 
and asp i ra t ions of the Sikh Panth wi l l find fu l l 
expression, s a t i s f a c t i o n and growth, 
3 . Eradicat ion of poverty and Starvation, by increased 
production and more e q u i t a b l e d i s t r i bu t ion of wealth 
and the establishment of a j u s t social order sans 
any explo i ta t ion . 
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4. vacat ion of discrimination on the bas i s of c a s t e , 
creed or i l l i t e r a c y in keeping with bas ic p r inc ip l e s 
of Sikhism. 
5. S t r iv ing for the removal of d iseases and i l l - h e a l t h , 
denouncement of use of in tox ican t s and enlargement 
of f a c i l i t i e s for physical well-being t o prepare and 
enthuse the Nation for the National defence. 
FIRST PART 
The Shiromani Akali Dal considers i t i t s primary 
duty to i n c u l c a t e among the Sikhs, r e l i g i o u s fervour and 
a pride i n t h e i r r i ch re l ig ious her i t age for which i t 
proposes t o pursue the following programme : 
(a^ Re i te ra t ion of the concept of the un ic i ty (Oneness) 
of God, medi ta t ion on His Name, r e c i t a t i o n of Gurbani, 
renewal of f a i t h to the ten Holy Sikh Gurus and the 
Holy S i r Guru Granth Sahib and other appropr ia te 
measures for such a purpose. 
(b) GroOBoing accomplished preachers , Ragis, Dhadis, and 
poets i n the Sikhs /,d.ssionary co l lege for a more 
ef fec t ive propagation of sikhism, sikh Philosophy, 
be l ief i n s ikh code of conduct and Kir tan e t c . , a t home 
and abroad, i n schools and co l l eges , i n v i l l a g e s and 
in c i t i e s as indeed at every p lace , 
(c) Baptising the Sikhs (Ararit parchar ) on a vast scale , 
with p a r t i c u l a r emphasis on Schools and Colleges of 
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which the t eache r s and the taught sha l l be enthused 
through r egu la r study c i r c l e s . 
(d) Reinculcate the r e l ig ious prac t ice of 'DASKtAKD' among 
the Sikhs, (Giving one-tenth of one's earn ings for the 
welfare of t he Community). 
( e ) Generating f ee l ings of respect for the Sikhs i n t e -
l l e c t u a l s , w r i t e r s , preachers , Granthis , e t c . , who 
also i n t u r n , would be enthused to improve upon t h e i r 
accomplishments while conforming to the bas ic Sikh 
tenets ana t r a d i t i o n s , 
( f ) Streamlining the Gurdwaras adminis t ra t ion by giving 
be t t e r t r a i n i n g t o t h e i r workers. Appropriate s teps 
would a l so be taken t o maintain Gurdwara bu i ld ings 
in proper condi t ion . For such a purpose, the party 
represen ta t ives i n the Shiromani Gurdwara parbandhak 
Committee and loca l Committees would be d i r e c t e d time 
to time to p u l l t h e i r weight. 
(gj Making appropr ia te arrangements for the e r r o r free 
publ icat ion of Gurbani, promoting research work in 
the ancient and modern Sikh his tory as a l s o i t s 
publ ica t ion, rendering Gurbani in other languages and 
producing f i r s t r a t e l i t e r a t u r e on Sikhism. 
(hj Taking appropr ia te s teps for the enactment of an All 
India Gurdwara Act with a view to in t roduce improvements 
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i n the administrat ion of the Gurdwaras throughout 
the Country and to r e i n t e g r a t e the t r a d i t i o n a l preaching 
sec t s of sikhism l ike Udasis and Nirmalas with the 
mainstream of Sikhism without in any way encroaching on 
the p roper t i e s of t h e i r r e spec t ive individual ' m a t h s ' . 
( i ) Taking such steps as may be necessary to bring the 
Sikh Gurdw-ras a l l over the world under a s ing le system 
of admirdstrat ion with a view to run them according 
t o the basic Sikh norms and t o pool t h e i r sources for 
the dissemination of Sikhism on a wider and more 
impressive sca le . 
( j ) S t r iv ing for free access t o a l l those holy Sikh Shrines, 
including Nankana Sahib from which the Sikh panth 
has been separated for pilgrimage and proper upkeep. 
POLITICAL GOAL 
The p o l i t i c a l goal of the Panth, without doubt, 
i s ensnrined in the commandments of the Tenth Lord, i n 
t h e pages of the Sikh h i s to ry and in the very hear t of 
the Khalsa Panth, the u l t imate objective of which i s the 
pre-eminence of the Khalsa. 
The fundamental pol icy of the Shiromani Akali Dal 
i s t o seek the r ea l i z a t i on of t h i s b i r th r ight of the 
Khalsa through crea t ion of ongenial environment and a 
p o l i t i c a l set up. 
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FOR ATTAINi'AENT OF THIS AIM 
1. The Shiromani Akali Dal i s determined t o s t r i v e by 
a l l poss ib le means to : 
(a ) Have a l l those Punjabi-speaking a reas , de l ibera te ly 
kept out of Punjab, such as Dalhousie in Gurdaspur 
D i s t r i c t , Chandigarh, pinjore-Kalka and Ambalau 
Saddar e t c . , in Ambala D i s t r i c t , the en t i r e Una 
t e h s i l of Hoshiarpur D i s t r i c t , the 'Desh' area of 
Nalagarh, Shahabad and Gulha blocks of Karnal 
D i s t r i c t , Tohana Sub-Tehsil, Ratia block and Sirsa 
t e h s i l of Hissar D i s t r i c t and s ix t e h s i l s of Ganga-
nagar D i s t r i c t in Rajasthan, merged with Punjab t o 
c o n s t i t u t e a single admin is t ra t ive un i t where the 
i n t e r e s t s of the Sikhs and sikhism are speci f ica l ly 
p ro t ec t ed . 
(b) In t h i s new Punjab and in o ther s t a t e s the cen t r e ' s 
i n t e r f e r ence would be r e s t r i c t e d to Defence, Foreign 
r e l a t i o n s , Currency and General communication, a l l 
o ther departments would be i n the j u r i s d i c t i o n of 
Punjab (and other s t a t e s ) which would be ful ly 
e n t i t l e d to frame own Laws on these Subjects for 
admin is t ra t ion , for the above departments of the 
Centre, , Punjab and other S t a t e s contr ibute in 
propor t ion to representat ion i n the Parliament, 
(c) The Sikhs and other r e l i g i o u s minor i t ies l iv ing out 
of Punjab should be adequately protected against any 
kind of discrimination. 
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2. The Shiromani Akali Dal would a l so endeavour to 
have the Indian Cons t i t u t ion recas t on r ea l federa l 
p r i n c i p l e s , with equal representa t ion at the c e n t r e for 
a l l the S t a t e s . 
3. The Shiromani Akali Dal strongly denounces the 
foreign policy of India framed by the congress p a r t y . I t 
i s worthless, hopeless and highly detr imental t o the 
i n t e r e s t s of the Country, the Nation and the lAankind 
a t l a rge . Shirocoani Akali Dai sha l l extend i t s support 
only to tha t fore ign pplicy of India which i s based on the 
p r i i x i p l e s of Peace and National i n t e r e s t s . I t s t rongly 
advocates a po l icy of peace with a l l neighbouring 
coun t r i es , e spec i a l l y those inhabited by the Sikhs and 
t h e i r sacred sh r i ne s . The Akali Dal i s of the firm view 
t h a t our foreign pol icy should in no case play second 
f iddle t o tha t of any other country, 
4, The Shiromani Akali Dal shal l r a i s e i t s firm 
voice against any d iscr imina t ion against any Sikh (or 
even other) employees of the Central or s t a t e Governments. 
The Shiromani Akali Dal sha l l a l so endeavour to maintain 
the t r a d i t i o n a l pos i t i on of the Sikhs in a l l the wings 
of the defence departments and the panth would pay 
p a r t i c u l a r a t t e n t i o n to the needs of the Sikh Armymen, 
The Shiromani Akali Dal would a l so see tha t ' k i r p a n ' i s 
accepted as an i n t e g r a l pa r t of the Uniform of the Sikhs 
i n Array. 
l ( J t 
5. I t sha l l be the primary duty of the Shiromani 
Akali Dal to help r e h a b i l i t a t e the ex-servicemen of the 
Deferx:e Departments i n the c i v i l l i f e and/or such a purpose 
i t would extend them every help t o enable them to organize 
themselves so tha t they are able to ra i se t h e i r voice in 
an ef fec t ive way for gaining adequate concessions and 
proper safeguards for a l i f e of se l f - respec t and d ign i ty , 
6. The Shiromani Akali Dal i s of the firm opinion 
t h a t a l l those persons - males or females - who have not 
been convicted of any criminal offence by a court of law, 
should be a t l i b e r t y to possess a l l types of small arras, 
l i k e revolvers , guns, p i s t o l s , r i f l e s , carbines e t c . , 
without any l i c ence , the only obl igat ion being t h e i r 
r e g i s t r a t i o n , 
7. The Shiromani Akali Dal seeks ban on the sa le of 
l i q u o r and other in tox ican t s and shal l press for p roh ib i t i on 
on the consumption of i n tox i can t s and smoking on public 
p l a c e s , 
THE ECONOMIC POLICY AND PROGRA/vU;E OF THE SHIROMANI AKALI DAL 
As adopted by i t s Working committee on 17th October, 1973 
a t i t s meeting held a t Sri Anandpur Sahib, 
Although the mainstay of the Indian economy i s 
a g r i c u l t u r e and a l l those p o l i t i c a l pov;ers who claim to 
r a i s e soc ia l s t ruc tu re on the ba s i s of j u s t i c e cannot 
afford to ignore t h i s fac t , yet t h i s i s a hard f ac t tha t 
t he l e v e l s of economic powers, continue to be in the 
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hands of big t r a d e r s , c a p i t a l i s t s and monopol is ts . Some 
marginal bene f i t s might have accrued to o the r c l a s s e s , but 
the real bene f i t s of economic grov.th have been reaped by 
these ca tegor ies during the l a s t 26 years a f t e r Independence. 
The p o l i t i c a l power has a l so been misappropriated by these 
c lasses which a re wielding the same for t h e i r own bene f i t s . 
As such, any peaceful attempt to usher i n a new era of 
social j u s t i c e would have to break the economic and 
p o l i t i c a l s trongholds of these categories of t he people. 
The Shiromani Akali Dal strongly advocates t h a t 
the growing gulf between the r ich and the poor, i n the 
urban and ru ra l a reas both should be abridged bu t , i t 
i s of the firm opinion t h a t , for such a purpose, the f i r s t 
assaul t would have t o be made on the c lasses who have 
assumed a l l the r e i n s of economic power i n t h e i r hands. 
In rural a r e a s , t he Akali Dal determined t o help the 
weaker c l a s s e s , l i k e the scheduled ca s t e s , backward 
c lasses , l and less t enan t s , ordinary l aboure r s , t he poor 
and middle c l a s s farmers. For such a purpose, i t stands 
for meaningful land reforms which envisage a c e i l i n g of 
30 standard ac res and the d i s t r i bu t i on of excess land 
araohg the poor farmers. 
The motto of the Shiromani Akali Dal i s to provide 
employment for a l l , r equ i s i t e food and c lo th ing for a l l , 
a house to l i v e i n , su i table t ranspor t and to c r e a t e 
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means to f u l f i l a l l those n e c e s s i t i e s of a c iv i l i z ed 
l i f e without which l i f e appears incomplete. 
As such, the economic pol icy of the Shiromani Akali 
L;al shal l endeavour to achieve the following object ives : 
AGRlCULTbdE SECTOR 
During recent years the ag r i cu l tu re sector has 
witnessed land reforms and green revolution. The Shiromani 
Akali Dal undertakes to enr ich the green revolut ion by 
an increase in yield per a c r e . I t shal l a lso ensure 
pe rcep t ib le improvement in the standard of l iv ing of 
a l l ru ra l c l a s ses , more p a r t i c u l a r l y of the poor and the 
middle c lass farmers, as a l so the landless l aboure rs . For 
such a purpose i t plans to work on the following l i n e s : 
(a ) Introducing land reforms and measures for increas ing 
agr icu l tu ra l production with a view to remove the 
growing gap between the r i c h and the poor. For such 
a purpose the ex is t ing l e g i s l a t i o n on land ce i l ing 
would have to be revised and a firm cei l ing of 30 
standard acres per family would have to be enforced 
with proprietary r i g h t s to the actual t i l l e r s . The 
excess land would be d i s t r i b u t e d among the land-
l e s s tenants and poor farmers, wiiile the c u l t i v a b l e 
government land lying unused shall be d i s t r i b u t e d 
among the landless c l a s s e s , especially the scheduled 
castes and t r i b e s . While d i s t r i bu t ing such lands 
the i n t e r e s t s of Hari jan and Landless labourers 
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would be p a r t i c u l a r l y taken care of. The Akali Dal 
would a l s o consider the p o s s i b i l i t i e s of allowing 
the t enan t s to service loans by mortgaging land 
under t h e i r plough, as also prohib i t ing the scheduled 
c a s t e s / t r i b e s and backward c lasses from mortgaging 
the land d i s t r i b u t e d among them. 
(b) The Shironaiii Akali Dal shal l v;ork for the moderni-
zat ion of farming and would a lso t r y t o enable the 
middle c l a s s and poor farmers t o seek loans and 
inputs made ava i lab le by dif ferent agenc ies . 
(c ) The Shiromani Akali Dal sha l l t ry to f i x the pr ices 
of the a g r i c u l t u r a l produce on the b a s i s of the 
re tu rns of the middle c lass fanners. Such pr ices 
would be no t i f i ed well before the sowing season and 
only the S ta t e governments would be empowered to 
fix such p r i c e s . 
(d) The ShiromaM Akali Dal stands for complete nationa-
l i z a t i o n of the t rade in foodgrains and as such, 
sha l l endeavour to nat ional ize the wholesale trade 
in foodgrains tnrough the establishment of s t a t e 
agencies . 
(e) The Shiromani Akali Dal strongly oppose the demar-
ca t ion of food zones and the a t tendant r e s t r i c t i o n s 
on the movements of foodgrains. The whole country 
should be the single food zone. 
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The party shal l make spec ia l efforts to bring 
the Thein Dam and the Bhatinca Thermal plant to a speedy 
completion so t h a t increased and cheaper power and i r r i -
ga t ion f a c i l i t i e s are a v a i l a b l e . Dessure ef for t s would 
be made for the establishment of an Atomic power s t a t ion 
i n the S t a t e . 
co-operat ive soc ie t i e s would be set up in the ru ra l 
a r e a s . In a l l those areas where canal water i s not 
ava i l ab le small i r r i g a t i o n p r o j e c t s would be taken in 
hand. 
INDUSTRIAL SBCTOR 
The Shiromani Akali Dal s t rongly advocates tha t a l l 
key i n d u s t r i e s should be brought under the public sec tor . 
I t i s of the opinion t h a t basic consumer i n d u s t r i e s 
should be immediately na t iona l ized to s t ab i l i z e t he p r i ces 
of the consumer goods and t o save the poor consumer from 
exp lo i t a t i on a t the hands of t he i n d u s t r i a l i s t s and the 
middleman. 
The public sector i n d u s t r i e s should be es tabl i shed 
i n such a way tha t the imbalance between d i f fe ren t S ta tes 
i s removed. 
A planned effor t to e s t a b l i s h agro- indus t r ies i n 
the rura l areas should be made t o rel ieve the growing 
populat ion pressure in the urban a reas . The i r d u s t r i a l 
management should be democratized by enabling the workers 
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t o have a say in the management and by f a i r d i s t r i b u t i o n 
of prof i t s between the I n d u s t r i a l i s t s and the workers. 
The c red i t agencies , especia l ly the nat ional ized banks 
should be d i rec ted to invest a fixed r a t i o of t h e i r 
deposi ts i n the r u r a l a r ea s . Every indus t r i a l un i t beyond 
worth one crore a s s e t s should be brought under the public 
sec tor . The Akali Dal stands for progressive n a t i o n a l i -
zat ion of Transport . 
The Punjab Sector un i t s should be fu l ly autonomous 
and manned by competent young executive drawn from a 
cen t ra l pool of t a l e n t . 
ECONOMIC POLICY 
The Shiromani Akali Dal demands tha t the whole tax 
s t ruc ture be revised in such a way that the evasion of 
taxes and the flow of black money i s conpletely e rad ica ted . 
I t stands for a simple and s t r a igh t forward system of 
t axa t ion . The present in f ra s t ruc tu re of t axa t i on weighs 
heavily against the poor and enables the r ich t o by pass 
i t . The party stands for a more r e a l i s t i c policy i n t h i s 
respect so that the black money running a p a r a l l e l economy 
may be usefully employed, 
WOflKERS, MIDDLE CLASS EMPLOYEES AND AGRICULTURAL i^ BOUR 
For t h e i r benef i t s the Shiromani Akali Dal would t r y i t s 
bes t : 
1 . To fix need-based wages for indus t r ia l workers. 
l iO 
2. To bring progressive improvement i n the standard of 
l iv ing of government employees. 
3 . To r e -a s ses s the minimum wages of ag r i cu l tu ra l labour 
and to standard of l iving for them, 
4 . To take necessary steps to provide roofed accommodation 
for standard of l iving for them. 
5. To take necessary steps to provide roofed accommodation 
for the ru ra l and urlgan poor. 
UNEN'^PLQYlv.ENT 
The Shiromani Akali Dal stands for f u l l employment 
in the country. For such a purpose i t i s of the firm 
opinion t h a t the Government must provide immediate 
employment to the educated and t r a ined persons, otherwise 
reasonable unemployment allowance should be paid to them. 
This amount should be shared by the centre and the s t a t e 
government. The minimum ra t e s of such an allowance should 
be as under ; 
1. iViatric and/or t ra ined hands Rs. 50 per month 
2. B.A. a s . 75 per month 
3. M.A. Rs.lOO per month 
4. Engineers and Doctors Rs.l50 per month 
*5 , Other t r a ined labour Rs. 50 per month 
All persons above the age of 65 should be given old age 
pension. 
*These r a t e s were fixed in 1973. 
I l l 
VffiAKER SECTION AND BACKWARD CLASSES 
The Shiromani Akali Dal s h a l l t r y to improve the 
economic condi t ions of the backward c l a s s e s and weaker 
sec t ions of society by extending them f a c i l i t i e s for 
education employment and other concess ions , t o enable tnera 
t o come a t par with other s ec t ions of soc ie ty , Foodgrains 
a t cheaper r a t e s would be made ava i l ab l e to them, 
EDUCATIONAL AND CULTURAL 
The Shiromani Akali Dal aims a t grooming the Sikhs 
i n t o a strong and sturdy Nation highly educated, fu l ly 
aware of i t s fundamental r i g h t s , very well versed in 
var ious a r t s and ever ready to honour the more outstanding 
of i t s sons . For such a purpose : 
1 , The Shiromani Akali Dal regards the educa t iona l i s t s , 
s c i e n t i s t s , philosophers, p o e t s , wr i te rs and a r t i s t s 
of the Sikh Nation as i t s most pr ized a s s e t . 
2 , The Shiromani Akali Dal s tands for compulsory and free 
education upon raatric s tandard . 
3 , To check the growing r a t e of unemployment, Shiromani 
Akali Dal would t ry to in t roduce such courses of 
study as wpuld enable t h e i r s tudents to get immediate 
employment on completion of a course, 
4, The Shiromani Akali Dal sha l l made arrangements for the 
education of the lural and weaker c lasses and would 
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a lso make provision for the higher education of the 
more promising students among them. 
5 . Punjabi would be a compulsory subject for a l l s tudents 
upto t he matric standard, 
6« Special a t t e n t i o n would be paid to the science and 
t echn ica l f i e lds of educat ion, with p a r t i c u l a r 
emphasis on the study of nuc lear physics and space 
science in the Un ive r s i t i e s . 
7. The Shiroraani Akali Dal sha l l t r y to improve the 
standard of games and bring them on level with i n t e r -
na t iona l s tandards. 
Dateu : 1,8.1977 Sd/-
GIANI AJMER SINGH 
Secretary, 
Shiromani Akali Dal 
* * * * * 
Source : Verinder Grover, (Ed , j The Story of Punjab ; 
Yesterday and Today, v o l . I l l , Deep and Deep 
Pub l i ca t ions , New Delhi , 1995, 
A P P E N D I X - B 
RAJIV GANDHI ~ LONGa^L ACCORD 24 JULY 1985 
RAJIV GANuHl-LOhJGOVAL ACCORD 24 JULY 1985 
1, Ccrapensatior. to innocent persons k i l l e d , 
1.1 Along with ex-:jratia payment to those innocent k i l l e d 
i n a g i t a t i o n or any action. , a f t e r 1,8,1982 compensa-
t i o n for property damaged wi l l a l s o be paid, 
2, Army requirement. 
2.1 All c i t i z e n s of the country have the r i g h t to enro l l 
i n the array and merit w i l l remain the c r i t e r i o n for 
s e l e c t i o n , 
3, Enquiry in to November i n c i d e n t s . 
3,1 The Ju r i sd i c t i on of Mr, J u s t i c e Ranganath f.ishra 
commission enquiring in to the November r i o t s of ue lh i 
would be extended to cover the d i s turbances a t 
aokaro and Kanpur a l so , 
4, Rehab i l i t a t ion of those discharged from the army, 
4.1 For a l l those d i scharged ,e f for t s v.dll be made to 
r e h a b i l i t a t e and provide gainful employment, 
5, A l l - Ind i a Qurdwara Act, 
5.1 The Government of India agrees to consider the formula 
t i o n of an All-India Government B i l l . Legis la t ion wi l l 
be Drought forward for t h i s purpose i n consul ta t ion 
witii ohiroraani Akali u a l , others concerned and a f t e r 
f u l f i l l i n g a l l re levant c o n s t i t u t i o n a l requirements. 
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6, Disposal of pending c a s e s . 
6.1 The no t i f i ca t ioe applyingthe Armed forces Special 
Powers Act, Punjab wi l l be witharawn. 
Existing special cou r t s wi l l t ry only cases r e l a t i n g to 
the following t pes of offences: 
(A ) Viaging war 
(b) Hijacking. 
6.2 All other cases wi l l oe t ransfer red to ordinary 
co.<rts and enabling l e g i s l a t i o n i f needed wil l oe 
brought forv;ard in t h i s session of Parl iament . 
7. Territorial claims 
7.1 The capi ta l p ro jec t area of Chanaigarh wi l l go t o 
Punjab. 
ocie adjoining a reas which were previously par t of 
Hiddi or the Punjabi regions v;ere included intiie Union 
t e r r i t o r y , uith the c a p i t a l region going to Punjab the 
areas which were aaded to the Union t e r r i t o r y from the 
Punjabi region of the e r s twh i l e s t a te of i-unjab wil l be 
t ransfer red to Punjab and those from Hindi region to 
Haryana. The en t i re Sukhna lake wil l be kept as par t of 
the Chandigarh and wi l l thus go to Punjab. 
7.2 I t had always been maintained by Mrs, Ind i ra Qanchi 
tha t when Chandigarh i s to go to Punjab some n i n d i -
speaking t e r r i t o r i e s in Punjab wi l l go to "aryana. 
A commission wil l be cons t i tu t ed to aetermine the 
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specif ic Hindi-speaking areas of Punjab which sould go t o 
Haryana, in l i e u of Chandigarh. 
The p r i n c i p l e of cont inui ty and l i n g u i s t i c affiiity 
witn a v i l l a g e as a unity wil l be the b a s i s of such 
determinat ion. 
The commission vdll be required t o ' g i v e i t s f indings 
by December 31 , 1985 and these wi l l be binding on both 
s ides . 
The work of the commission wi l l oe l imi ted to t h i s 
aspect and w i l l be a i s t i n c t from the general boundary 
claims which the other commission re fe r red to in para 
7.4 w i l l handle. 
7.4 The ac tua l t ransfer of Chandigarh to Punjab artd 
areas in l i e u therefore to naryana wi l l take place simul-
taneously on January 26, 1986. 
7.4 There a re other claims and counter-cla ims for read-
justment of dar ies O t e r r i t o r i e s ) . The government wil l 
appoint ( i n addit^-onto } the exis t ing r^unjab-Haryana 
ooundary (commission; another commission to consider 
these mat te rs and give i t s f indings . Such findings wi l l 
be binding on the concerned s t a t e s . The terms of refereooe 
will be based on a vi l lage as a un i t , l i n g u i s t i c a f f in i ty 
and contigEjity. 
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8. Centre-State r e l a t i o n s 
8.1 shiromani Akali Dal s ta tes that the Anandpur Sahib 
resolut ion i s e n t i r e l y within the framework of the 
Inaian C o n s t i t u t i o n , that i t at tempts t o define the 
consept of u e n t r e - S t a t e r e l a t ions in a manner which 
may bring out the t rue federal c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of 
our unitary c o n s t i t u t i o n , and tha t the purpose of the 
resolut ion i s t o provide grea ter autonom; to the 
s ta te vdth a view to strengtnening the unity and 
in teg r i ty of the country, since uni ty in d i v e r s i t y 
forriis the corner -s tone of our nat ional e n t i t y . 
8.2 In view of the above, the Anandpur Sahib r e so lu t i on 
insofar as i t deals with Centre-Sta te r e l a t i o n s , stands 
to the Sarkaria Commission. 
9. Sharing of r i v e r s waters. 
9.1 The farmers of Punjab, Haryana and oajasthan w i l l 
continue to get v;ater not l e s s than what they a re 
using from tne iiavi-i^eas s, stern as on 1.7.1965. 
("iaters used for consumptive purposes wi l l a l so 
remain unaffected, quantum of usage claimed sha l l be 
verified by the t r ibunal referred to in para 9 .2 
below. 
9.2 The claims of x^unjab and ^aryana regarding the 
snares in t h e i r remaining v*aters wi l l be ref^Cred 
or adjudicat ion t o a t r ibunal to be presided over 
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by a Supreme Court judge. The dec is ion of t h i s 
t r i buna l vd.ll be rendered wi th in six months and would 
be binding on both p a r t i e s . Al l l ega l and .cons t i tu t iona l 
steps required in t h i s respect be taken expedi t iously , 
9.3 The coet ruc t ion of the SYL canal shal l continue. 
The canal shal l be completed by August 15, 1986. 
10. Representation of minorities. 
l u . l Existing i n s t ruc t ions regarding protec t ion of i n t e -
r e s t s of minor i t ies vdll be r e c i r cu l a t ed to the 
s t a t e Chief min i s t e r s , (pM w i l l wr i te t o a l l Chief 
iViinisters ; . 
11 , promotion of Punjabi language, 
11,1 The Central Government may take some steps for the 
promotion of the Punjabi language. 
This sett lement brings to an end a period of confron-
t a t i o n and ushers in an era of amity, goodwill and coope-
r a t i o n , v;hich wi l l promote and s t rengthen the unity and 
i n t e g r i t y of Ind ia , 
* * * * * 
Source : Verinder Grover, (ed. ) The Story of Punjab: 
Yesterday and Today, Vol, III, Deep and Deep 
Publications, New Delhi, 1995. 
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